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APPLYING RESTITUTION TO REMEDY A
DISCRIMINATORY DENIAL OF PARTNERSHIP
Candace S. Kovacic*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite saying that discrimination in any form must not be
tolerated, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has held that a federal statute prohibiting employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex does not apply to a large law part-
nership's decision whether to elevate an associate to partner or to
ask her to leave the firm.1 The effect of this decision is to give
partnerships the right to discriminate in the selection of partners
without violating federal law, although, according to the Eleventh
Circuit, the law firm might be liable under a state contract or mis-
representation action. Contract and tort damages, however, may
not provide a plaintiff with an adequate remedy because the dam-
ages may be either speculative or nominal. If federal law is inappli-
cable and contract and tort damages are inadequate, one is initially
left with a sense of injustice that there has been an injury without
a remedy.
To induce well qualified lawyers to join their firm, partners of
a large law firm often tell prospective associates that if they join
the firm, they will be eligible to compete for partnership-they will
be on the "partnership track." This assurance of eligibility is a ma-
terial promise by the firm to those associates who would not join
the firm without that promise and to those who work exceptionally
long hours, not only because they want to do well professionally,
but also because they are competing for partnership positions for
which they are assured they are eligible. When a law firm discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex, race or religion in the selection of part-
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ington, D.C.; A.B., Wellesley College, 1969; J.D., Northeastern University, 1974. I would like
to thank Marsha Dubrow, Peter Jaszi, Allen King, Grant Nelson, James Oakes, Joseph Pe-
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ners, the law firm breaks its promise that the associate was eligible
to compete for partnership and ignores the diligent work of the
associate that was materially motivated by that promise.
The law firm also pockets -a benefit from that associate. The
firm typically bills the hours that an associate works on various
client matters to those clients at an hourly rate. The proceeds from
the "billable hours" are generally substantially higher than the sal-
ary, related overhead, and other benefits the associate receives at
the firm's expense, particularly if the associate is industrious and
working to become a partner. For example, if an associate bills
1600 hours per year for six years before a discriminatory denial of
partnership, the benefit to the firm, after deduction of salary and
related overhead may be $270,000.2 If an associate is extraordina-
rily hard working and bills 60 hours a week for 48 weeks per year
for six years before a discriminatory denial of partnership, the ben-
efit to the firm, after deduction of salary and related overhead,
may be more than $800,000.1
There is an action, not always well understood and as a result
sometimes underutilized, that will remedy this type of injustice.
That action is restitution, or liability based upon unjust enrich-
ment. Restitution is independent of federal law and provides a
remedy different from typical tort and contract damage remedies.
Under restitution a defendant is required to disgorge the ben-
efit that the defendant received at the plaintiff's expense when the
defendant's retention of the benefit would be unjust. A material
breach of contract, such as the breach of a promise of eligibility to
compete for partnership, is one of the situations for which recovery
in restitution is granted. Discrimination itself could be another. An
action in restitution, unlike an action under the federal anti-dis-
crimination statute as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit, permits
a plaintiff to conduct discovery and attempt to prove that she was
discriminated against on the basis of sex, race, color, religion or
national origin and, therefore, that the partners failed to keep their
promise that she was eligible for partnership.
If she succeeds in this proof and also proves that she would
not have joined the firm but for the promise of eligibility, the part-
nership would not be entitled to retain any benefit. It would there-
2. See infra Table 1, p. 777.
3. See infra Table 3, p. 778.
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fore have to disgorge the value of her billable hours after deducting
the value of salary and related overhead. If she proves she would
have joined the firm but would have worked fewer hours, the firm
would have to disgorge its benefit from the extra hours worked. If
no discrimination in the denial of partnership is proved, then the
defendant did not breach its contract with the associate and would
be entitled to retain the benefits from that contract. These would
include the benefit of the work of the associate who was rejected
for partnership for reasons other than ineligibility because of sex,
race, color, religion or national origin.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that restitution is
an appropriate action to remedy a discriminatory denial of part-
nership. This article assumes a plaintiff can prove discrimination.
Thus, the article does not include in its scope a discussion of how
to prove discrimination. Part II of this article will discuss why fed-
eral law is currently inapplicable in one circuit and why contract
and tort damage actions are inadequate to remedy this discrimina-
tion, thus demonstrating that an action in restitution is impor-
tant.4 Part III of this article will describe how restitution can rem-
edy such discrimination, discussing the general principles of
restitution, why it is underutilized, and its advantages. 5 Part IV
will apply the three major elements of restitution to a discrimina-
tory denial of partnership: (1) the defendant received a benefit, (2)
at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) which would be unjust for the
defendant to retain.6
The analysis of this article is equally applicable to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, race, color, religion or national origin. Be-
cause the case in the Eleventh Circuit involved sex discrimination,
this article will discuss the issue in terms of sex discrimination.
The analysis will also apply to any business with benefits analo-
gous to those gained by law firms from the associate's billable
hours.
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted a writ of
certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.7 If the Su-
preme Court affirms the judgment and holds that federal law is
inapplicable to partnership decisions, the theory described in this
4. See infra notes 9-60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 61-125 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 126-208 and accompanying text.
7. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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article is useful because it provides plaintiffs with an alternative
state law action. If the Supreme Court reverses the judgment and
holds that federal law is applicable to partnership decisions, this
theory is still useful in two ways. First, it provides a plaintiff with
a pendant state cause of action. The pendant action is useful be-
cause it provides relief if a plaintiff can prove she was discrimi-
nated against in the partnership decision by not being considered
for partner because she is a woman or by being considered more
stringently than a man. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,8 if a plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering that the law firm
make her a partner, she may have to prove not only discrimination
in the selection process, but also that she would have been made a
partner but for the discrimination. Second, restitution might be an
appropriate remedy in a Title VII action.
H. THE NEcEssrrY OF RESTITUTION TO REMEDY A DISCRIMINATORY
DENIAL OF PARTNERSHIP
A. Hishon v. King & Spalding: Title VII Does Not Apply to
Partnership Decisions
In Hishon v. King & Spalding,9 Elizabeth Hishon brought suit
against a law firm, King & Spalding, claiming that the firm's deci-
sion not to promote her to partnership was based upon sex dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.10 Hishon had accepted a position as an associate with King &
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). This act prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See id. § 2000e-
2(a).
9. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
In the Title VII count in her complaint, Hishon also claimed that specific instances of
sex discrimination had occurred during her six years prior to being considered for partner-
[Vol. 34:743746
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Spalding in 1972.11 Approximately six years later, in May, 1978,
the partners of King & Spalding "decided not to invite her to join
the partnership" in the 100 lawyer firm.'2 As a result of that deci-
sion, which Hishon claimed was based on sex discrimination, King
& Spalding required Hishon to leave the firm after a reasonable
time to find other employment. 3 After receiving this decision,
Hishon filed a sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. The Commission issued a notice of
right to sue and Hishon filed a complaint in district court.14 King
& Spalding moved to dismiss Hishon's suit pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "on the ground
that in selecting partners the defendant is not subject to Title VII
. ,". The district court granted the law firm's motion to
dismiss."
On June 17, 1982, the Eleventh Circuit in Hishon stated that
"discrimination in any form must not be tolerated. 1 7 Ignoring its
all inclusive prohibition, however, the Eleventh Circuit, by a vote
of two to one, affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
held "that Title VII does not apply to decisions regarding partner-
ship.""8 The basis for the majority's holding was that a partnership
is a "voluntary association."' 19 The dissenting judge on the Elev-
ship at the firm, but she limited her appeal to the partnership question. Hishon, 678 F.2d at
1025 n.4. Hishon had two additional counts in her complaint: violation of the Equal Pay Act
§ 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976), and breach of contract. Those two counts were withdrawn
by Hishon and dismissed without prejudice. See 678 F.2d at 1025 n.5.
11. 678 F.2d at 1024.
12. Id. (footnote omitted). The firm had at that time fifty active partners, approxi-
mately fifty associates, and other support personnel. Id. at 1028. After the initial rejection,
Hishon sought reconsideration from the firm, but was unsuccessful. Id. at 1024.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 1024-25.
15. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
16. Id. The district court held that Title VII did not apply to partnership "elections"
and that if it did, it would violate the partners' constitutional right to freedom of associa-
tion. The district court said of its holding, "while the right of defendant to freedom of asso-
ciation seems clear, the coverage of the Act seems doubtful and obscure." Id. at 1306; see
infra notes 24, 25, and 35 for references to commentators who disagree with both of the
district court's holdings.
17. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1024.
18. Id.
19. In the introductory paragraph of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated: "While
the arguments are appealing and discrimination in any form must not be tolerated, we can-
not overlook the essence of a partnership-voluntary association." Id. In discussing the dis-
missal of the plaintiff's claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Eleventh Circuit added:
1983]
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enth Circuit's panel would have held that Title VII applies when
the "direct consequence" of a decision not to elect an associate
into membership in the partnership was, as here, "to terminate her
employment" although he agreed that "Title VII would not apply
to the discrete decision whether to take on a new partner," such as
"invitations to lawyers who were not associates in the firm." 0 As a
result of the Hishon case, unless it is reversed by the Supreme
Court, Title VII cannot be used in the Eleventh Circuit to prevent
or remedy discrimination in partnership decisions by law firms.21
Title VII does prohibit law firms from discriminating in the
initial hiring of associate lawyers.22 It is extraordinary that Title
VII could be interpreted to require law firms to consider without
discrimination applicant lawyers for a job that will end after six
years because of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion
conflicts with a district court opinion in the Eastern District of
"Even under the most liberal reading we cannot find the requisite congressional intent to
permit Title VII's intervention into matters of voluntary association." Hishon, 678 F.2d at
1026.
In rejecting Hishon's first argument, the Eleventh Circuit said:
We find a clear distinction between employers of a corporation and partners of a
law firm. In making this distinction, we do not presume to exalt form over sub-
stance. In this instance, however, the form is the substance, and we are unwilling to
dictate partnership decisions under the guise of employee promotions protected by
Title VII. The very essence of a partnership is the voluntary joinder of all partners
with each other.
Id. at 1028. In rejecting appellants second argument, the Eleventh Circuit said: "[W]e de-
cline to extend the meaning of 'employment opportunities' beyond its intended context by
encroaching upon individuals' decisions to voluntarily associate in a business partnership."
Id. In rejecting Hishon's third argument, the majority stated: "[W]hen the termination is a
result of the partnership decision, it loses its separate identity and must fall prey to the
same ill-fate as her original attempt to apply Title VII to partnership decisions." Id. at
1029.
By holding that the form is the substance, the Eleventh Circuit has created different
Title VII results for different law firms, depending upon which organizational structure they
have chosen. Many law firms use the corporate structure and are therefore subject to Title
VII. See Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 463 &
nn. 35-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tenure and Partnership]. For discussions by
commentators anticipating and suggesting the inaccuracy of the court's conclusion, see infra
note 24.
20. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1030 & n.1.
21. For a discussion of other reasons why Title VII may be inadequate to remedy dis-
crimination, see Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Reme-
dies for Employment Discrimination, 5 H~Av. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 37-40 (1982).
22. See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); Blank v. Sullivan
& Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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New York 8 and with the conclusions of commentators.24 It rests
on conclusory reasoning.
The Eleventh Circuit's assertion that matters of voluntary as-
sociation are exempt from Title VII applicability was made with-
out authority. The court did not call "voluntary association" a
right nor could it have done so.25 The Eleventh Circuit did not
quote any language from Title VII to support the "voluntary asso-
ciation" exemption, nor did it discuss why Title VII, with its many
explicit exemptions, would also contain an implicit exemption for
"voluntary association. '26 Generally, where exceptions to a general
23. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
24. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv.
947, 983-84 (1982); Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination
Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 615, 639-40 (1967); White, Women
in the Law, 65 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1051, 1106-07 & n.93 (1967); Note, Tenure and Partnership,
supra note 19, at 460-63, 468-69; Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legisla-
tion to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. Rav. 282, 286-95, 312-18 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Note, Selection of a Law Partner]. See generally Waintroob, The Developing
Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21
Wm. & MARY L. Rzv. 45, 119 (1979).
25. The district court had ruled that the law firm had a constitutional right to volun-
tary association. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1306
(N.D. Ga. 1980); see also supra note 16. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not discuss the
Constitution nor call voluntary association a right.
The district court in Hishon had relied on Justice Goldberg's dicta in Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964), that "it is the constitutional right of every person ... to choose
his... busines partners." Hishon, 24 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1303. The district
court stated: "The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized 'freedom of association.' Unfor-
tunately, however, it has not dealt with the subject in the context of business and commer-
cial partnerships, except for the comments of Mr. Justice Goldberg ..... Id. The district
court also quoted Justice Harlan in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), who said that
"beliefs sought to be advanced by association [can] pertain to economic... matters ......
Id. at 460. Associating to express views about economic beliefs, however, is different from
associating to earn money. The latter is not an expression of belief. The district court in
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), recognized this dis-
tinction. The court said that the Supreme Court "does not recognize any First Amendment
privacy or associational rights for a commercial, profit-making business organization of the
nature of [a large law] partnership. Cases recognizing such First Amendment rights refer to
fraternal or social organizations not business organizations." Id. at 129. See Bartholet, supra
note 24, at 983-84; White, supra note 24, at 1107 n.93; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra
note 19, at 468-69; Note, Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 312-18 for discus-
sions as to why there is no Title VII exemption for voluntary association. See generally
Waintroob, supra note 24, at 119. But cf. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1156
(S.D. Tex. 1970): "[A]ny truly private organization or association, such as... a business
partnership... would be beyond the bounds of government regulation with regard to mem-
bership." Id. at 1156 (dictum).
26. Title VII prohibits "unlawful employment practices," as defined, by employers
against both employees and applicants for employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Part-
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prohibition are explicit, additional exceptions are not implied. 7
Given the broad remedial purpose of Title VII, implicit exclusions
are all the more disfavored.28 In addition, by prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination, Title VII deliberately regulates association
that otherwise would be voluntary.29
Hishon had raised three separate grounds why a discrimina-
tory denial of partnership violates Title VII. She analogized large
partnerships to corporations and argued that elevation to partner-
ship is an employment relationship of the type governed by Title
VII because partners in a large partnership are employees of that
partnership for purposes of Title VII.O Next she argued that an
"opportunity"31 for "elevation to partnership 3 2 is a "term, condi-
tion or privilege of employment" of an associate protected from
discrimination by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VIP 3 and/or an "em-
ployment opportunity" of an associate protected from discrimina-
tion by Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 4 Finally, she argued that
nerships are explicitly included in the definition of "person," which is included in the defini-
tion of "employer." Id. §§ 2000e(a), (b). The term "employer" explicitly exempts private
clubs as voluntary associations but only if they are exempt from federal taxation. Id. §
2000e(b). No other voluntary association is explicitly exempted. The term "employer" also
exempts industries not affecting commerce, industries with less than fifteen employees, the
United States, United States-owned corporations, Indian tribes, and certain District of Co-
lumbia agencies. Id. In addition, the phrase "unlawful employment practices" has a number
of statutory exclusions or defenses, none of which mention voluntary association. See id.
27. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (Title IX's broad protec-
tion of "persons" includes employees of educational institutions because employees exten-
sive statutory exemptions do not include such employees and will not be extended).
28. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). That court stated that
"because [Title VII] is remedial in character, it should be liberally construed, and ambigui-
ties should be resolved in favor of the complaining party." Id. at 831 (footnotes omitted).
The Hishon court cited Spirides. See 678 F.2d at 1027.
29. See Bartholet, supra note 24, at 983-84.
30. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1026. Title VII prohibits "unlawful employment practices" and
thus requires an "employment context." Id. For an analysis of why law partners are employ-
ees for purposes of Title VII and why a discriminatory denial of partnership is "an unlawful
employment practice," see Note, Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 286-92; see
also Paone & Reis, supra note 24, at 639; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra note 19, at
461-63. But cf. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners not employees for
purposes of determining whether acounting firm has 15 employees within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
31. 678 F.2d at 1028.
32. Id. at 1026.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
34. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). For an analysis of why advancement to partnership is either a
"term, condition or privilege of employment" or an "employment opportunity," see Note,
Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 292-95; see also Paone & Reis, supra note 24,
750
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the requirement that an associate leave the firm after an adverse
partnership decision when that decision is based on sex is a "dis-
charge... because of... sex" which is "an unlawful employment
practice" prohibited by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VIIU .
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the first argument by dis-
missing, without useful explanation, analogous cases. For example,
it dismissed a United States Supreme Court case that "held that
partnerships have 'an established institutional identity indepen-
dent of its individual partners"' 86 by saying "[flor many purposes,
such as the fifth amendment's protection, this 'separate identity'
will yield results similar to those for corporations, but not for Title
VII.'"'  The Eleventh Circuit gave no reasoning or authority for
why a partnership should be treated one way for purposes of the
fifth amendment and another for purposes of Title VII.e s
at 640; White, supra note 24, at 1006; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra note 19, at 460-
61.
35. 678 F.2d at 1028. The dissenting judge in Hishon would have found Title VII appli-
cable on this ground. See id. at 1030; supra text accompanying note 20; see also Note, Se-
lection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 295 n.82.
36. 678 F.2d at 1026 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)).
37. Id. at 1026.
38. See id. The Eleventh Circuit similarly rejected Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop-
erative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961) and Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211
(5th Cir. 1974), with insufficient analysis. The Eleventh Circuit characterized these cases as
holding "that part ownership of a business does not preclude a person's classification as an
employee subject to federal employment legislation." 678 F.2d at 1027. Apparently agreeing
that these cases could support a holding that a partner can simultaneously be classified as
an employee for purposes of Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit said: "It would be unrealistic to
assume a person cannot maintain a proprietary interest and simultaneously work in the
business. Mutual exclusivity neither exists nor is required in a law firm in order for the firm
to maintain its desired partnership structure." Id. In the next sentence, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit rejected these cases by changing the issue. The court stated that "this lack of
exclusivity, however, does not render the term 'partner' equivalent to the term 'employee'
for purposes of Title VIU' Id. The issue, however, was not whether the terms were
equivalent but whether one person could be dually classified, as Goldberg and Pettway held.
No further authority was given to distinguish them.
The Eleventh Circuit relied upon Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977). In
Burke, the court held that partners are not employees for the purpose of determining
whether an employer had 15 employees. Id. Title VII defines an "employer" as a person
"who has fifteen or more employees.... ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b). The Seventh Circuit in
Burke did not mention Bellis, Goldberg or Pettway; rather, it quoted definitions of partner-
ships and concluded that since partners are employers who own a business they cannot be
employees. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869. Burke also cited dicta in Equal Employment
Comm'n v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 181 (N.D. I. 1975), which held that associ-
ates of a law firm were employees, for the proposition that if the associates had been part-
ners they might not have been employees. 556 F.2d at 869 n.1.
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As to Hishon's second argument, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
"We have no quarrel with the premise that an 'opportunity' can
include promotion to a position beyond that of an 'employee' cov-
ered by Title VII."' 9 The court then rejected that premise for an
associate in a law firm, again without explanation beyond distin-
guishing or rejecting cases to the contrary, 0 by stating that "once
again, we decline to extend the meaning of 'employment opportu-
nities' beyond its intended context by encroaching upon individu-
als' decisions to voluntarily associate in business partnerships."' 1
The Eleventh Circuit did not explain what the "intended context"
includes, whose intent it is, how the intended context is deter-
mined, or why the context does not include voluntary association. 3
In regard to Hishon's final argument, the Eleventh Circuit ap-
parently ignored the reality of the discharge. The court rejected
the discharge argument with an inexplicable metaphor, stating
that Hishon was seeking to establish her cause of action "through
the proverbial back door.' 43 While noting that "discriminatory ter-
mination alone may have stated a cause of action under Title VII
for an unlawful discharge," the court, again without authority,
stated that "when the termination is a result of the partnership
decision, it loses its separate identity and must fall prey to the
same ill-fate as the original attempt to apply Title VII to partner-
ship decisions.
' '45
The court did not explain how a termination loses its identity
39. 678 F.2d at 1028.
40. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), a case which prohibited discrimination in an election of employees
to a board that owned the stock of the company in trust for the employees, on the ground
that the employees elected to the board remained employees of the company and were own-
ers of the company as trustees, not in their individual capacities. Id. That point, however,
goes to the argument that partners are employees. Whether or not the "trustees" remain
employees is irrelevant to the holding that an election to a board of "trustees" (or a partner-
ship) can be an opportunity of employment.
The Eleventh Circuit also "disagree[d]" with the holding of the District Court of the
Southern District of New York that "'the opportunity to become a partner was a "term,
condition or privilege of employment" and an "employment opportunity." '" Hiahon, 678
F.2d at 1029 (quoting Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)).
41. Id. at 1028.
42. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.





except by an apparent "assumption of the risk" theory. The court
stated that "just as she [Hishon] accepted a representation made
to her concerning partnership consideration, appellant likewise as-
sumed the risk that an unfavorable decision would set in motion
the termination procedure under the firm's 'up or out' policy."
46
For application of assumption of the risk, however, the plaintiff
must be aware of the risk and undertake it voluntarily.47 While
Hishon assumed the risk that she would not be made a partner in
the normal course of competing with others, she did not assume
the risk that she would be discriminated against because she is a
woman. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that a promise of partner-
ship will not create Title VII liability when the promise is discrimi-
natorily breached, but the breach of that promise will insulate
what would otherwise be a prohibited discriminatory discharge
from Title VII consequences. The dissenting judge found this last
rationale "too glib."
'48
The reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit does not effectively re-
but Hishon's arguments; therefore, the court's conclusion that
partnership decisions are exempt from Title VII should not survive
for long. Having granted the plaintiff's writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court has the opportunity to reverse the
Eleventh Circuit's judgment. If the Court does not reverse the
judgment, as discussed earlier, 49 restitution will provide an alterna-
tive state action. If the Court does reverse, restitution will provide
a pendant action with relief and proof different from that in a Ti-
tle VII action 50 or restitution might provide a remedy under Title
VI
5 1
B. State Contract and Tort Causes of Action
Possibly recognizing that its holding was leaving a wrong with-
out a remedy, the Eleventh Circuit in Hishon stated that "per-
haps" Hishon would have "an action in breach of contract or mis-
46. Id. at 1029-30.
47. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 447 (4th ed. 1971).
48. 678 F.2d at 1030.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
50. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), holding that "Title VII does not preempt
other remedies in private employment." Id. at 833; see also infra text accompanying notes
205-07.
51. Since this article does not discuss the applicability of Title VI1, whether and how
restitution would fit within Title VII remedies are outside the scope of this article.
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representation." 52 State contract and tort actions, however, are
generally inadequate to remedy a plaintiff's discriminatory denial
3f partnership because damages may be nominal or impossible to
ascertain or an element of the cause of action may be lacking.
For example, if the partnership promises an associate that she
would become a partner upon satisfactory completion of work,5 s
damages for a breach of contract might be difficult to measure be-
cause the value of a partnership is not readily apparent. 54 Even if
they could be measured, damages might be nominal or nonexistent
because of a plaintiff's duty to mitigate. If the plaintiff finds an
equally lucrative or more lucrative position, there will be no dam-
ages for the discrimination. 5 If the partnership's promise was the
more typical promise of an opportunity to compete for a limited
number of partnership slots, contract damages might be specula-
tive. Even though the plaintiff may prove that she was excluded
from eligibility because of her sex, she may not be able to prove
that she would have received one of the partnership slots had she
not been discriminated against.5 "
With respect to a cause of action in tort for "deceptively
made" representations,57 an action in deceit generally requires that
the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff.5 " Proof of a deceit-
ful denial of partnership might be difficult because a partnership
may not have decided to discriminate in choosing partners when
52. 678 F.2d at 1029.
53. The Eleventh Circuit said that Hishon alleged that the law firm had represented
"to her that in return for satisfactory work as an associate for a designated number of years,
an invitation to partnership would be forthcoming." Id. at 1028.
54. One author suggests that monetary compensation for a discriminatory denial of
partnership under Title VII could be awarded at the rate of a partner's earnings until the
associate finds another position or as a lump sum "that would fully compensate the em-
ployee for the lost opportunity with the. . . firm." Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra
note 19, at 465 n.51. The author did not suggest how the lump sum would be calculated, but
said that a "monetary award . . . presents administrative difficulties in computing the
amount of the award and determining whether the plaintiff has made an appropriate effort
to mitigate damages." Id. at 466 (footnotes omitted).
55. See generally Note, Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 320. The author
suggests that compensatory damages under Title VII could be ordered "in an amount
equivalent to the plaintiff's expected earnings as a partner less mitigation." Id. Another
commentator suggests that compensation for severe mental distress could be awarded as
well. See Wald, supra note 21, at 54-58.
56. See infra text accompanying note 199.
57. See Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1029.
58. See W. PROSSER, supra note 47, § 105, at 686.
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the associate originally was hired. That decision, conscious or un-
conscious,sa may have been made six or more years later.
Thus, because contract and tort damage actions are often in-
adequate to remedy discrimination, when a court, such as the
Hishon court, denies the applicability of Title VII to partnership
promotions, there is a sense of injustice from -the conclusion that a
wrong may have been committed for which there is no remedy, or
no adequate remedy. 0 That conclusion is unnecessary.
III. RESTITUTION OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS AN ADEQUATE AND
EFFEcTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO TITLE VII
The sense of injustice caused by Title VI's inapplicability to
partnership decisions is derived not only from the fact of discrimi-
nation, but also from the fact that a large law partnership typically
promises newly hired associates that they are eligible to compete
for a limited number of partnership positions. This promise of eli-
gibility often motivates a lawyer to join the firm, and this need to
compete for partnership often motivates an associate who seeks
partnership to work many hours, often taking on extra work.61
When a firm discriminates, or claims the right to discriminate, in
making its partnership decisions, 2 it breaches its promise that the
associate was eligible to compete for partnership and ignores the
59. Discrimination can be unconscious. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of
Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 114 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1045 (1979) (sex
discrimination can be conscious or unconscious); Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 135 (6th
Cir. 1978) (racial discrimination can be conscious or unconscious in grand jury selection).
60. "[I]n order of logic Right comes before Remedy. There ought to be a remedy for
every wrong.... ." F.W. MArrLAND, THE FORMs OF AcTION AT COMMON LAW 6 (1948).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 166-87.
62. In Hishon the plaintiff never had the opportunity to prove that she was discrimi-
nated against. Because the defendants moved for a dismissal under FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1),
the district court assumed the existence of discrimination for purposes of holding that Title
VII was inapplicable to partnership decisions. Thus, the effect of the law firm's argument,
which was upheld, was that for purposes of Title VII the firm either discriminated or had
the right to discriminate in selecting partners. The majority in Hishon held that a "dismis-
sal under FD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is proper only when 'it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim, which would entitle [her] to
relief.'" 678 F.2d at 1026 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The dissent
agreed: "Hishon alleges, and we must assume, that King & Spalding discriminated against
her on account of her sex by its decision to deny her partnership and to terminate her
employment." Id. at 1030; see also United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), stating
that "[b]ecause the District Court dismissed her complaint, the facts which she has alleged
are taken as true." Id. at 554.
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many hours of work its promise motivated.
Those many hours, however, financially benefit a partnership.
The firm bills the associates's work on an hourly basis to a client.
The total yearly value of the hours is generally substantially higher
than what the associate received from the firm at its expense,68 and
that excess benefits the firm. Thus, the injustice of the Hishon case
is based on the facts that the law firm was enriched by the work of
the associate, that the work was materially motivated by the firm's
promise of an opportunity to compete for partnership, and that
this motivation was disregarded by the firm when it discriminated
against the associate.
Restitution or "liability based in unjust enrichment""4 is a
"generally accepted and widely applied" source of liability that can
remedy this sort of injustice."5 Restitution prevents a defendant's
unjust enrichment by enabling a plaintiff to seek recovery, in law
or equity, of a benefit that the defendant unjustly gained or re-
tained at the plaintiff's expense." If the benefit to be recovered is
money, the action is at law and is often referred to as quasi-con-
tract.6 7 If the benefit to be recovered is specific property or money
that has been traced, the action is in equity and is often referred to
as a constructive trust.6 8
A. Definition of Restitution
In 1937, the Restatement of Restitution defined liability based
on unjust enrichment by saying: "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
63. See infra text accompanying notes 129-38.
64. 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 2 (1978) (footnote omitted).
65. Id. For a discussion of other alternatives to Title VII, see Wald, supra note 21, at
42-72. Wald discusses alternatives such as state anti-discrimination statutes; common-law
claims based on breach of contracts that imply a prohibition of sex discrimination or a gen-
eral duty of good faith; tortious claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
intentional interference with contractual relations; and application of state unfair or decep-
tive business practices acts. The article does not discuss a discriminatory denial of partner-
ship or restitution. Cf. Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Employment Discrimination
Claims: Implementing Congressional Intent to Allow Alternate Modes of Redress in a Sin-
gle Action, 31 MERCER L. REv. 781 (1980) (state causes of action mentioned in discussion of
pendent jurisdiction).
66. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 1-2 (1937) (general scope note); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF REsTITuTION 2, 87-88 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (introductory comments).




to the other.""' In 1983, the Tentative Draft No. 1 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Restitution elaborated that definition. The Sec-
ond Restatement provided that "[a] person who receives a benefit
by reason of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss
suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and
amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
'70
Professor Palmer, in his recent four volume treatise, The Law
of Restitution, avoided one overriding definition. He said:
Unjust enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that
justice is indefinable. But many of the meanings of justice are de-
rived from a sense of injustice, and this is true of restitution since
attention is centered on the prevention of injustice. Not all injus-
tice but rather one special variety: the unjust enrichment of one
person at the expense of another. This wide and imprecise idea
has played a creative role in the development of an important
branch of modern law.
7 1
Despite "imprecision," the many definitions of restitution ar-
ticulated throughout the years consistently contain the following
69. Id. § 1, at 9. The Restatement's introductory note on the measure of recovery
states:
Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking from the defendant
and restoring to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is
not done, causing the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore
the plaintiff to the position in which he was before the defendant received the
benefit.
Id. §§ 150-59, at 595-96. For a discussion of the dual meaning of the word restitution see
infra note 91. The Reporters for the American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution,
Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. Scott, described the Restatement's definition as follows:
A person has a right to have restored to him a benefit gained at his expense by
another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be unjust. The law pro-
tects this right by granting restitution of the benefit which otherwise would, in most
cases, unjustly enrich the recipient.
Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 LAw. Q. Rav. 29, 32 (1938). In 1954, almost 20 years later,
Professor Seavey said:
Restitution is the equitable principle by which one who has been enriched at the
expense of another, whether by mistake, or otherwise, is under a duty to return
what he has received or its value to the other. Perhaps unjust enrichment would be
a better term. But at least restitution, which connotes both legal and equitable rem-
edies, is more descriptive of its content than is "equitable remedies," and it is not
misleading, as is "quasi contract."
Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 257 (1954).
70. RESrATE NT (SEcoND) OF RazsTxON § 1, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
71. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.1, at 5 (footnote omitted).
72. Sir William David Evans' essay, The Action for Money Had and Received, in Es-
sAYs (1802) was, according to Dean Wade, "[t]he first significant writing in the field of Res-
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three elements: "(1) the defendant has been enriched by the re-
titution." Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1087
(1968). Evans described "the action for money had and received as enforcing an obligation
to refund money which ought not to be retained." Evans, supra, at 5. He stated:
This obligation was enforced according to the general principles of natural equity,
the foundation of it being a retention by one man of the property which he had
unduly received from another, or received for a purpose, the failure of which ren-
dered it improper that he should retain it. The mere legal liability to the original
payment was not the question in consideration, but the injustice of permitting the
money or other property, under all the circumstances, to be retained.
Id. at 6.
Dean Ames stated: "Quasi-contracts are founded. . . upon the fundamental principle
of justice that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. Rzv. 53, 64 (1888). Professor William A. Keener's, A
Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts was, according to Dean Wade "[t]he first true trea-
tise." Wade, supra, at 1088. Professor Keener articulated three bases for quasi-contractual
liability: "(1) upon a record; (2) upon a statutory, or official, or customary duty; or (3) upon
the doctrine that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of an-
other." W. KaaNR, A TReaTISE ON THE LAW OF QUAsi-CoNTRACTS 16 (1893). The first two
sources of liability are not based on unjust enrichment. See Comment, Restitution: Concept
and Terms, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 1167, 1167-68 & n.24 (1968) (discussion of analytic difference)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Concept and Terms]. Professor Keener regarded the third
as the major basis of quasi-contractual liability, stating:
By far the most important and most numerous illustrations of the scope of
quasi-contract are found in those cases where the plaintiff's right to recover rests
upon the doctrine that a man shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another.
As the question to be determined is not the defendant's intention, but what in
equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do, the liability, while enforced
in the action of assumpsit, is plainly of a quasi-contractual, and not contractual
nature.
W. KEENRm, supra, at 19-20.
Professor Woodward defined quasi-contracts as "legal obligations arising ... from the
receipt of a benefit the retention of which is unjust, and requiring the obligor to make resti-
tution." F. WOODwARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CoNTRACTS § 3, at 4 (1913). Professor Sullivan
stated: "Whether the defendant is a tortfeasor or a contract breacher, a showing that the
defendant unjustly has reaped a tangible gain at the expense of the plaintiff usually will
support recovery in quasi-contract." Sullivan, The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-
Contract, 64 Gzo. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1975). Professor Childres and Mr. Garamella stated that
"[t]he core of the law of restitution ... is settled, clear and unobjectionable....
[R]estitution disgorges the actual economic unjust enrichment, i.e., plaintiff's property
wrongfully held by the defendant ...... Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and
the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 433, 441-42 (1969).
Professor Douthwaite stated that:
[R]estitution can be had by either harnessing doctrines which have their origins in
the common law-or doctrines which spring from the equity side of our jurispru-
dence.... [T]he underlying principle remains constant-recovery of a benefit
should be allowed where one has received the benefit under circumstances which
render it unjust that he should retain it.
G. DouTHwArTa, ATTORNEY'S GumE To RPrsIM uTION § 8.1, at 323 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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ceipt of a benefit; (2) the defendant's enrichment is at the plain-
tiff's expense; and (3) it would be unjust to allow the defendant to
retain the benefit. '7 8 Because it is unjust for the defendant to re-
tain the gain, plaintiff's recovery is generally measured by the
amount of the defendant's gain, not by the amount of the plain-
tiff's loss.7 4
There are a wide variety of situations in which courts define
when a benefit is unjust.7 5 One of those situations is a defendant's
total, or material, breach of a contract. With such a breach the
plaintiff has a choice of relief. The plaintiff can seek contract dam-
ages when they are adequate and capable of proof. The amount of
damages is measured by what she would have gained had the con-
tract been performed, less her mitigation of damages. In the alter-
native, she can seek restitution, which measures the defendant's
benefit received from the plaintiff. A discriminatory denial of part-
nership, when the associate had been promised that she was eligi-
ble to become a partner, is a material breach of a contract,7 which
enables the plaintiff to sue to recover the defendant's benefit. That
benefit is the value of the associate's billable hours minus salary
and related overhead.
B. Advantages of Restitution
A restitution remedy has a number of advantages over con-
tract or tort remedies for a discriminatory denial of partnership.
First, because the defendant's gain is substantial, a plaintiff's re-
Recently, in comparing restitution with damages in tort, Professor Friedmann stated:
"The law of restitution aims at preventing unjust enrichment. The law of torts deals with
the reparation of damage wrongfully inflicted." Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Ob-
tained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM.
L. Rzv. 504, 504 (1980).
73. Oesterle, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REv. 336, 337 (1980) (footnote omitted) (review-
ing G. PALJRR, THz LAW OF R TrtunoN (1978)). British scholars Goff and Jones stated:
The principle of unjust enrichment is capable of elaboration. It presupposes
three things: first, that the defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a benefit;
secondly, that he has been so enriched at the plaintiff's expense; and thirdly, that
it would be unjust to allow him to retain that benefit.
R. Go"? & G. JoNEs, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 13-14 (2d ed. 1978). This work is British, but
the authors survey American and British law, as well as law from other countries. See also
Wade, supra note 72, at 1095.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
75. See infra note 161.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 163-200.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 129-53.
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covery can provide a major deterrent to discrimination. 8 Second,
restitution provides a plaintiff with an opportunity to prove that
she was discriminated against.7 Third, restitution can be premised
on a promise of an opportunity to compete for partnership, not a
promise of a guarantee of partnership.80 Fourth, restitution re-
quires proof that the plaintiff was not considered for partnership
because of discrimination or was more stringently considered, not
proof that she would have obtained one of the partnership slots.3 1
Fifth, restitution does not require proof that the partners intended
to make a discriminatory partnership decision with respect to an
associate at the time they hired her.82 Sixth, restitution measures
plaintiff's recovery not by the amount of plaintiff's loss but rather
by the amount of defendant's gain, which, because of the readily
available computation of "billable hours," should not be a difficult
amount to ascertain." Seventh, restitution results in a monetary
recovery, not an injunction mandating working relationships,
which courts at times appear reluctant to order."' Eighth, generally
the statutes of limitations for restitution are six years.85 Ninth, al-
though restitution is not limited to situations for which other
causes of action are inadequate, it has frequently provided a rem-
edy where others fail. 6 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, res-
titution permits society to provide a remedy for a wrong rather
than to legitimate discrimination by providing no remedy at all.6
7
78. For discussions of the deterrent effect of damages for discrimination, see generally
Paone & Reis, supra note 24, at 642, 645; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra note 19, at
466 n.56; Note, Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24, at 320 n.208.
79. See supra note 62.
80. See supra note 53; infra text accompanying notes 159-93.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
82. See supra text accompanying note 58; infra text accompanying notes 159-93.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55; infra text accompanying notes 126-53.
84. It has been noted that some courts may be reluctant to mandate work relationships
at high levels of employment. See Bartholet, supra note 24, at 983; Hunt & Pazunick, Spe-
cial Problems in Litigating Upper Level Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 DzL. J. or
CoRP. LAw 114, 133 (1978); Note, Employment Discrimination Suits by Professionals:
Should the Reinstatement Remedy Be Granted?, 39 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 103, 109-10 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Discrimination Suits by Professionals]; Note, Selection of a Law
Partner, supra note 24, at 303; Note, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of
Title VII Professional Jobs, 54 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 165, 167 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Subjective Employment Criteria]; infra note 195.
85. See infra note 208.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 205-07.
87. See supra note 60.
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C. Restitution is Unnecessarily Underutilized
The reason that the Eleventh Circuit in Hishon did not sug-
gest restitution as a possible cause of action or remedy may have
been that restitution "has been slow to emerge as a general the-
ory"88 and is not well understood. As Professor Dawson said in
1951, "it is doubtful even now whether most lawyers have an ade-
quate conception of the range and resources of the remedy."89 It is
doubtful whether the situation has much improved in the last
thirty years.90
One reason restitution is not well understood may be that
there is a great deal of confusion in terminology. The word "resti-
tution" is used to refer both to a cause of action and a remedy.9 1
88. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.1, at 2. Dean Ames said in 1888:
The equitable principle which lies at the foundation of the great bulk of quasi-
contracts, namely, that one person shall not unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another, has established itself very gradually in the Common Law. Indeed, one
seeks in vain today in the treatises upon the Law of Contract for an adequate ac-
count of the nature, importance, and numerous applications of this principle.
Ames, supra note 72, at 66 (footnote omitted); see also Childres & Garamella, supra note
72, at 434. "Restitution, as a unified concept, is even newer than the reliance damages doc-
trine." Id.
89. J. DAwsON, UNJUST ERiHmmNT 22 (1951). Professor Dawson also said: "[M]any
lawyers still approach the restitution remedies with uncertainty and wonder." Dawson, Res-
titution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959); see also Seavey & Scott, supra note 69,
at 32. "[Restitution's] outlines have been dimly perceived and little discussed." Id.
90. For example, Professor Douthwaite stated:
When considering the measure of compensation for a wrong, the practitioner typi-
cally thinks in terms of proven damages .... But if he so restricts his thinking he
may be depriving his client of a considerable sum of money.
[A] wrongdoer's profits as an alternative to his victim's proven damages
can, more often than not, be recovered on the theory of a constructive trust... [or]
in quasi contract.
Douthwaite, The Tortfeasor's Profits-A Brief Survey, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1071 (1968).
Professor Douthwaite said, over ten years later, that "[iut simply isn't true to say that resti-
tutionary problems don't often come up on the practitioner's desk. The trouble is that usu-
ally he hasn't thought about the restitutionary implications or potential of the problem
before him." G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 72, § 1.1, at 2.
91. See Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1191-98 for a discussion and
documentation of the dual usage of the word "restitution." The Restatement of Restitution
itself uses the term with both meanings. Not only does it use the title Restitution and speak
of "restitutionary rights," but it also speaks of the requirement "to make restitution." Com-
pare RESTATE ENT OF RESTITUTION 2 (1937) (general scope note) with id. § 1, at 12. The
Tentative Draft No. 1 of the Second Restatement states: "The distinction [between rights
and remedies] cannot be so clearly marked in restitution law as is usually possible in tort or
contract law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
1983]
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At times restitution is used synonymously with "unjust enrich-
ment" and "quasi-contract."9 2 Quasi-contract, in turn, is used sy-
nonymously with contract-implied-in-law and both are at times
confused with contract-implied-in-fact. 93 In addition, restitution
"sometimes refer[s] to the disgorging of something which has been
taken and other times refer[s] to compensation for injury done.' '4
The confusion has a historic base. Much of the common law
developed and evolved through the expansion of forms of action or
the substitution of a procedurally preferable form for an older
form. Fictions were frequently used to facilitate the expansion or
substitution. 5 In order to prevent a defendant's unjust enrichment
by applying the well utilized form of action of assumpsit, for exam-
ple, the law courts used the fiction of an "implied promise."' 6 The
law courts held that the law implied a promise to pay in situations
in which no intent on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff
could be inferred from the defendant's words or deeds. This came
to be known as a contract-implied-in-law or quasi-contract. As
Professor Palmer stated: "The fiction of a contract was being used
to allow recovery in a contract form of action, and in retrospect the
reason for doing so was to deprive the defendant of an unjust en-
92. See Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1188-92. Even books by the
leading writers on the subject are differently titled. See, e.g., J. DAWSON, supra note 89
(Unjust Enrichment); W. KEENER, supra note 72 (A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Con-
tracts); G. PALMER, supra note 64 (The Law of Restitution); REsTATEmENT oF RESTITUTION
§ 1 (1937).
93. See infra note 104.
94. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1220 (1973)
(footnote omitted).
95. For a detailed history of the development of the common law, see J. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HIsToRY (2d ed. 1979); S. MmsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (1969).
96. For detailed discussions of the historical development of restitution, see J. BAKR,
supra note 95, at 300-14; J. DAWSON, supra note 89, at 9-40; R. GoFF AND G. JoNES, supra
note 73, at 3-14; W. KEENER, supra note 72, at 14-15; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, §§ 1.1-.5,
at 1-33; Ames, supra note 72, at 63-69; Douthwaite, supra note 90, at 1074-75; Perillo, supra
note 94, at 1210-12; Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 32-33; Sullivan, supra note 72, at 2-4;
Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1167-70. Courts of law also applied the
common counts of money had and received, quantum meruit, and quantum valebat to situ-
ations of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., G. DOUTHwArr, supra note 72, § 1.3, at 7; R. GOFF &
G. JONES, supra note 73, at 3; Childres & Garamella, supra note 72, at 435-36 n.14; Dawson,
supra note 89, at 175-76. The courts of equity also developed liability based on unjust en-
richment under doctrines of constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation and accounting.
J. DAWSON, supra note 89, at 34-40; see also supra note 68.
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richment.' '9 7 Similarly, the equity courts used the fiction of a con-
structive trust, implying that the defendant, as a constructive trus-
tee, was holding property for the plaintiff, although, again, the
defendant had evidenced no intent to act as a trustee and did not
have a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff."
When the old forms of action were abolished, however, the
"fictitious promise seemed immortal,"" and that fiction now cre-
ates confusion. For example, sometimes a court will deny liability
in quasi-contract because no agreement between the parties was
proven 00 or will deny liability in contract-implied-in-fact because
the defendant was not enriched. 101 Quasi-contract, or contract-im-
plied-in-law, is, however, an action to prevent unjust enrichment
and does not necessarily require proof of consensual elements of
contract law, although the action may involve "unwinding"1 2 un-
enforceable or frustrated agreements or remedying a material
breach of contract.1 0 3 A contract-implied-in-fact is, in contrast, an
actual contract.1 0 ' A similar confusion exists with respect to con-
97. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.2, at 7; see also G. DOUTHWArTE, supra note 72,
§ 1.1, at 3. As Professor Keener said:
It was only natural, therefore, that the courts in using a purely contractual remedy
to give relief in a class of cases possessing none of the elements of contract, should
have resorted to fictions to justify such a course. This was done in the extension of
assumpsit to quasi-contract; and the insuperable difficulty of proving a promise
where none existed was met by the statement that 'the law implied a prom-
ise' . . . . The fiction of a promise was adopted then in this class of cases solely
that the remedy of assumpsit might be used to cover a class of cases where, in fact,
there was no promise.
W. KEENER, supra note 72, at 14-15.
98. See G. DOUTHWAITB, supra note 72, § 1.1, at 3; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.3, at
12-13.
99. J. BAKER, supra note 95, at 312.
100. See infra note 104 for discussions by commentators who review the cases.
101. See Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 563 P.2d 48 (1977).
102. Perillo, supra note 94, at 1208, 1209.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 163-200.
104. See W. KEENER, supra note 72, at 7-11; Ames, supra note 72, at 63-64; Corbin,
Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533, 546-547 (1912) [hereinafter cited as
Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations]. This confusion between contract-implied-in-law
(quasi-contract) and contract-implied-in-fact has existed for a long time.
In 1893, Professor Keener stated: "Notwithstanding the existence and recognition of
this well-defined line of demarcation between genuine contracts, whether express or implied,
and quasi-contracts, there exists the greatest confusion in the application thereof in prac-
tice. Thus Blackstone confuses contracts implied in fact and quasi-contracts . W." 
KEENER, supra note 72, at 7. Professor Corbin also stated in this regard:
The new rights are actually different from the old rights, but it requires a clear head
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structive trusts and actual trusts.105
The continued use of the old terms that evolved from the old
fictions has not only made application of the terms difficult, but
has also obscured the fact that restitution, or liability in unjust
enrichment, is an important source of liability.108 Restitution can
for analysis and some knowledge of legal history to tell them apart and to under-
stand their true character. A great many of those rights now usually referred to as
quasi-contractual are among these newly recognized rights. But they have long
been described in the terms applicable to real contracts and enforced as if they were
really contractual. An examination of the cases dealing with them will quickly
demonstrate how many are the judges who do not understand their true character,
and how easy it is to be led astray by the misleading terminology.
Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit of Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1910) [hereinafter
cited as Corbin, Waiver of Tort].
Confusion still exists today. See G. DouTHwArTE, supra note 72, § 1.1, at 2-3; 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.2, at 8; Dawson, supra note 89, at 176; see also York, Extension
of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499 (1957). "The distinction
between contracts implied in fact and those implied in law continues to trouble the courts
both as to the nature of the distinction and the practical procedural consequences." Id. at
501 n.6; see Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1189-90. "The principal criti-
cism of the term ['quasi-contract'] is its connection to contract, and although this connec-
tion has been occasionally defended, it seems clear that it is fallacious and has caused con-
siderable confusion in the courts." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Professor Perillo appears not to dispute that there has been confusion with respect to
contracts and quasi-contracts, but he cautioned that the assumptions "that there is nothing
contractual about quasi-contractual obligations [and] that quasi-contractual obligations are
imposed by law to prevent unjust enrichment ... are only partly correct." Perillo, supra
note 94, at 1208. He said that courts should not be limited to awarding a plaintiff the bene-
fit received by the defendant when the dispute at issue involves unwinding a contract that
cannot or can no longer be enforced. Restricting recovery to what the defendant gained does
not always restore the plaintiff to the status quo ante and "tend[s] to obscure the need to
protect a party from unjust impoverishment." Id. at 1220. Thus, limiting the unwinding of
contracts to the law of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment does not provide sufficient jus-
tice. See id. at 1223-26.
105. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.3, at 12.
106. Restitution is widely recognized as a source of liability. The Second Restatement
provides:
A given set of circumstances may give rise to both a right to restitution and a tort
claim, or to both a right to restitution and to some other relief for breach of con-
tract. Rules of tort and contract law are important, in many circumstances, as
guides determining whether or not a right to restitution exists. Yet a duty to make
restitution has a basis independent of those rules. .-. . Restitution law shares some
of the aims of tort law and contract law, but is distinct from both.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTrruTION § 1 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
Professor Palmer began his 1978 four volume treatise on Restitution by saying: "It has
been traditional to regard tort and contract as the two principal sources of civil liability at
common law. . . .There is another category that must be separated from ...these; this is
liability based in unjust enrichment." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.1, at 1-2. Professor
Palmer also mentioned liability arising out of a fiduciary relationship as a separate source of
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provide a plaintiff with a remedy that is measured by the amount
liability. Id.; see also J. BAKmR, supra note 95, at 314. "It was only in the last twenty years
that restitution began to be firmly established in England as a discrete body of principles
wholly independent of contract ... ." Id.; see G. DouTHwArr, supra note 72, § 1.1, at 2.
"In this country Restitution has come into its own as a third branch of the law, as important
in its potential as are Contracts and Torts." Id.; see Oesterle, supra note 73, at 336. "Knowl-
edgeable observers of American Law have recognized for over fifty years that restitution is a
discrete body of legal and equitable rights and remedies based on the principle of rectifying
situations of unjust enrichment." Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Teller stated:
Restitution is a separate branch of law. Its distinguishing feature, one which
sets it apart from other categories of legal liability, lies in its measure of recovery.
The purpose is not to enforce contracts nor to award damages but to prevent unjust
enrichment. It looks not to the plaintiff's damages but to the benefit which the
defendant obtained or retains and to which he is not entitled.
Teller, Restitution As An Alternative Remedy for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40, 47 (1956); see also
Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1170-82.
This recognition of restitution as a separate source of liability began in the late 1800's:
[I]nterest was excited by a memorable article by Dean Ames on 'The History of
Assumpsit' (2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1888). Under the inspiration of Ames, Keener in 1893
produced a short treatise entitled 'Quasi Contracts' which, for the first time, set out
at considerable length the principles of the subject and a discussion of the cases.
Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 34. "It was not till the end of the nineteenth century that
anyone saw the interconnections between these scattered and diffused results, and Keener's
book on Quasi-Contract was published." J. DAwsON, supra note 89, at 21. "Keener and his
contemporaries sought to place the entire law of quasi-contracts on the foundations of the
unifying principles of unjust enrichment. Their efforts were remarkably successful." Perillo,
supra note 94, at 1212-13; see also Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1168-
69.
Major efforts to give unified treatment to restitution occurred in 1937 with the Ameri-
can Law Institute's THz RESTATxmNT OF RESTTUTION (1937), and in 1978 with Professor
George P. Palmer's four volume treatise The Law of Restitution, which discusses the theory
and catalogues and explains the many existing uses of restitution. According to Professor
Palmer, recognition of one unified doctrine of restitution "probably began with the publica-
tion of The Restatement of Restitution." 1 G. PALmER, supra note 64, § 1.1, at 4. The
Reporters Seavey and Scott said: "The purpose of the American Law Institute is to
analy[z]e the most important topics of the law and to state succinctly the rules which are
shown by analysis to represent the predominant American authority." Seavey & Scott,
supra note 69, at 29.
That restitution as a source of liability was not recognized earlier and is not always well
understood at present may be because, through fictions, the same language, such as assump-
sit, was used to provide remedies for many diverse situations. "[T]he application of old
remedies to new rights caused lawyers and judges, from that day to this, to describe the new
rights in the same terms as the old rights. The habit is inveterate and the results are often
pernicious." Corbin, Waiver of Tort, supra note 104, at 221-22. Professor Keener stated:
Although from time to time the judicial view of substantive rights broadened under
the leavening effect of equity and other considerations, the broadening process did
not lead to the creation of remedies sounding in neither contract nor tort. The
judges attempted, however, by means of fictions, to adapt the old remedies to the
new rights, with the result usually following the attempt to put new wine into old
bottles.
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of the defendant's gain in situations that could alternatively be
remedied with typical tort damages, which compensate for a plain-
tiff's loss, or with contract damages, which put a plaintiff in the
W. KEENER, supra note 72, at 14; see also Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at
1169. "The development of restitution has been sporadic and more the result of attempts to
bring new actions within the existing framework of the common law, than the result of a
purely logical progression." Id. "[T]he development of that part of the law of restitution
called quasi contract has been impeded by its historical connection with a contract form of
action." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.2, at 8. Professor Palmer also stated: "The term
'constructive trust' has the same disadvantage as 'quasi contract': it invites confusion with
express trust much as quasi contract invites confusion with contract." Id. § 1.3, at 12. "A
tendency to describe quantum meruit as a remedy in itself does little to clarify this distinc-
tion [between contract-implied-in-law and contract-implied-in-fact]." G. DoUTiwAMr,
supra note 72, § 1.1, at 3 (Supp. 1980).
In 1893, Professor Keener stated: "[T]his identification in classification of quasi-con-
tracts with genuine contracts [has] led to a confusion of ideas ...." W. KENER, supra
note 72, at 11. Baker noted that "legal fictions were abolished [in England] in 1852 ....
Lawyers still spoke of implied promises and waiving the tort, but as they lost familiarity
with the forms in which those ideas had been clothed it was easy for misconceptions to
flourish." J. BAKER, supra note 95, at 313. Goff and Jones said, 85 years after Keener, that
"study of the cases reveals that emphasis on implied contract, and the spurious connection
with contract which it implies, has inhibited discussion of substantive issues." R. GoFF & G.
JoNEs, supra note 73, at 9. They also said:
[A]fter the abolition of the forms of action. . . the fiction grew rather than dimin-
ished in importance. The abolition of the forms of action, which had for so long
provided the skeleton of the law, forced lawyers to find some new method of classi-
fying claims. This they found in the dichotomy of contract and tort; and the appar-
ently intractable quasi-contractual claims were relegated to the status of an appen-
dix to the law of contract ....
Yet there is no reason why the common law should be rigidly stratified into
contract and tort; and the assertion that the requirement of implied contract leads
to certainty is unintelligible. When is a contract to be implied? No logical answer
can be given to the question when recourse should be had to a fiction.
R. GoFF & G. JoNns, supra note 73, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). "This characterization ['con-
tract-implied-in-law'] resulted in strained and artificial analysis." Perillo, supra note 94, at
1211.
In 1938, the Restatement of Restitution's Reporters explained restitution's lack of rec-
ognition, saying:
That [restitution's] outlines have been dimly perceived and little discussed is due,
we think, to the fact that the English law has developed through forms of action;
the writings of analytical jurists have had little effect upon a bench and bar largely
historically minded and educated through the study of decisions in which procedure
has long played a predominant part.
Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 32. They explained further:
But although [the principle of restitution] has since [1760] been sporadically recog-
nized and although it underlies the decisions of many cases, the diverse sources of
the individual rules and the adherence by legal treatise writers and law teachers to
the divisions of the law created by historical accident rather than by analysis, have
prevented its common acceptance and a unified treatment.
Id. at 33-34.
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position she would have been in if the contract had been per-
formed. 10 7 Restitution can also provide that the defendant disgorge
his benefit in situations in which neither contract nor tort actions
will provide relief.108
There is a debate as to whether restitution is a cause of action
or a remedy for other causes of action,10 9 but that debate is irrele-
107. "For us an important use of restitution is an alternative remedy for various kinds
of wrongs." J. DAWSON, supra note 89, at 146. Professor Dawson said further that "in many
situations contract and unjust enrichment doctrines merge in application . . . ." Dawson,
supra note 89, at 176. As Professor Friedmann said recently with respect to the law of resti-
tution and torts:
Overlap between these two fields [restitution and torts] is not uncommon: it often
happens that an act tortiously injuring another benefits the tortfeasor. In such
cases, the law has long recognized the right of the injured party to "waive the tort,"
foregoing his claim for damages and seeking instead restitution of the tortfeasor's
gain.
Friedmann, supra note 72, at 504. Professor Teller stated that "[flor a tort or material
breach of contract by which the defendant is unjustly enriched, restitution is an alternative
remedy." Teller, supra note 106, at 47. With respect to the law of torts:
There is on the one hand the quasi-contractual relief against torts developed in
the common law actions-the venerable formula of waiver of the tort and suit in
assumpsit. The proposition is one of almost classical simplicity, i.e. if the tort-feasor
obtained a benefit directly from the injured party as a result of the commission of
the tort he had alternative duties of compensating for the harm done the injured
party in tort or of making restitution of the benefit thus obtained. The latter duty
could be enforced by the common law action of quasi-contract.
York, supra note 104, at 504.
Overlap is evidenced in part by the fact that restitution is indexed under a variety of
headings. See Wade, supra note 72, at 1087. "It has been only in recent years that legal
writings have undertaken to cover more than particular areas of the law of Restitution. In
the digests, the cases have not been grouped together, and any attempt to collect and collate
them necessarily runs into serious difficulties." Id.; see also G. DOUTHWArrs, supra note 72,
§ 1.1, at 3; Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 34-35; Comment, Concept and Terms, supra
note 72, at 1173.
108. "[I]n numberless situations, (e.g. mistake, duress, innocent misrepresentation,
many cases of illegal transaction, contracts discharged by impossibility) restitution is com-
monly the sole remedy." Teller, supra note 106, at 47 (footnote omitted). "In [a described]
situation plaintiff has another remedy, that is an action for damages for breach, whereas in
the other [described] situations, the only possible remedy open to him is restitution." 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.1, at 365. "The only remedy available to the plaintiff [in certain
situations] is some form of restitution." 2 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 6.1, at 2; see also
Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARv. L. REv. 249, 250-257 (1898).
Professor Oesterle stated that "restitution must be separated from torts, contracts, and
fiduciary responsibility because restitution can provide a right to relief when none of the
other theories are helpful." Oesterle, supra note 73, at 342; see also Perillo, supra note 94,
at 1215. "In many of the situations in which there is a right to restitution there is no right
upon any theory of the law of contracts or of tort." Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 35.
109. As Professor Oesterle noted in his review of Professor Palmer's 1978 treatise:
Unfortunately, Professor Palmer's valuable treatise may turn out to be underused,
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vant to plaintiff's recovery for a discriminatory denial of partner-
perhaps for reasons similar to those that explain the declining popularity of classes
in restitution at American law schools. Law school curricula and statements by com-
mentators have led lawyers to regard the law of tort and contract (and, perhaps,
fiduciary responsibility) as the principal source of civil liability at common law. Res-
titution is viewed solely as an alternative remedy for tortious conduct or breaches of
contract.
Oesterle, supra note 73, at 341-42 (footnotes omitted). Professor Oesterle then discussed the
erroneousness and shortsightedness of this view. See id. at 351-64. For a commentator who
viewed restitution as a remedy see Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts 1, 10 HARv. L. Rzv.
209 (1896). "[Professor Keener's thesis should have been that restitution] is a remedy, dif-
fering from, but alternative with, damages... ." Id. at 227. Abbot's critique of Keener is
criticized by Learned Hand. See generally Hand, supra note 108. See Jackson, The Restate-
ment of Restitution, 10 Miss. L.J. 95 (1938). Jackson says that restitution is a remedy, while
unjust enrichment is a category of law "but its contents would be unlikely to agree with the
scheme of the Restatement." Id. at 96; see also Professor Palmer's discussion of the state-
ments of Professors Corbin and Woodward, 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.1 at 365-66 &
n.3.
It would appear to make analytic sense to analyze restitution as an alternative cause of
action rather than an alternative remedy because recovery in restitution is different from
recovery in tort or contract, see supra text accompanying note 74, because restitution pro-
vides remedies for situations that neither tort nor contract actions cover, see supra note 108,
and because restitution protects interests different from those protected by tort or contract
actions. The Reporters for the Restatement of Restitution said that the American Law
Institute
has recognized the tripartite division of the law into contracts, torts and restitution,
the division being made with reference to the purposes which each subject serves in
protecting one of three fundamental interests. In this division, the postulate of the
law of contracts ... is that a person is entitled to receive what another has prom-
ised him .... The law of torts is based upon the premise that a person has a right
not to be harmed by another .... Besides these two postulates there is a third,
sometimes overlapping the others, but different in its purpose. This third postulate
... can be expressed thus: A person has a right to have restored to him a benefit
gained at his expense by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would
be unjust. The law protects this right by granting restitution of the benefit which
otherwise would, in most cases, unjustly enrich the recipient.
Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 31-32. Professor Seavey also stated that:
Restitution is a term unknown to legal treatises, encyclopedias and digests, yet
it represents one of a trinity of principles which actuate the proceedings for reme-
dial justice. The law of contracts enforces promises. The rules of tort provide com-
pensation for harm. Restitution is the equitable principle by which one who has
been enriched at the expense of another, whether by mistake, or otherwise, is under
a duty to return what he has been received or its value to the other.
Seavey, supra note 69, at 257. Perillo noted, however, that prevention of unjust enrichment
is one rationale for enforcing some contracts. See Perillo, supra note 94, at 1213.
If restitution is viewed as a cause of action, attention could be focused on the elements
of restitution to determine when it is appropriate to apply the recovery. Even if an element
of restitution is also an element of a breach of contract or a tort, that element could still be
a restitutionary element. Tort and contract actions can at times provide alternative reme-
dies for the same situation, but those actions are not, therefore, viewed as merged. As Goff
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ship based on a breach of a material promise of eligibility.
Whether restitution is a remedy for that breach or whether that
breach triggers the applicability of the cause of action of restitu-
tion, the result will be the same.110
Another reason restitution may not be well understood is that
its application has at times been confused and inconsistent,"
without a precise framework delimiting its outer boundaries."'
Recognition of restitution, however, is more recent than recogni-
tion of torts and contracts. Even they developed slowly and were
subject to criticism.113 Because the framework is not fully devel-
and Jones stated:
In any event, that there may, on occasion, be an overlap between restitutionary
and other claims simply reflects the fact that the rubrics of the law are not water-
tight compartments, so that the same set of facts can well give rise to alternative
claims. A similar overlap often occurs between claims in contract and tort, as, for
example, when a bailee negligently damages goods, or a carrier negligently injures
passengers in his care.
R. GOFF & G. JoNEs, supra note 73, at 45. The fact that restitution is analyzed as a cause of
action does not mean that all of the old actions in quasi-contract, such as the unwinding of
agreements, must be categorized as restitutionary actions rather than as contract actions.
See supra note 104 for a discussion of Perillo's view that unwinding of unenforceable con-
tracts should not be limited to returning unjust enrichment.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 163-200.
111. "Confusion is probably inevitable in any large body of doctrine that has grown so
rapidly, from so many different directions, by the methods of case law." J. DAwsON, supra
note 89, at 112. "The law of quasi-contract looks like a grab bag of isolated instances rather
than a picture of the orderly development of a broad doctrine covering situations of unjust
enrichment." Douthwaite, supra note 90, at 1074.
112. Professor Palmer said that his treatise "will have served its principal purpose if it
contributes to an understanding of one of the important bases of legal liability: liability
based in unjust enrichment." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, at Preface. He disclaimed, how-
ever, "comprehensive" treatment of restitution: "I do not know whether a truly comprehen-
sive treatment of restitution can be written." Id.
Professor Oesterle said of Professor Palmer's work: "In this definitional morass, Profes-
sor Palmer operates with remarkable clarity . . . . [He provides] a herculean attempt at
providing integrity to this neglected branch of law." Oesterle, supra note 73, at 340. "Far
more substantial problems than proper nomenclature, however, pervade the law of restitu-
tion. The cardinal outlines of this branch of law are in dispute." Id. at 338. "Professor
Palmer, by focusing on the venerable and classic questions in restitution, avoids grappling
directly with the definition of restitution's outer limits." Id. at 340; see also Nicholas, Un-
justified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TuL. L. REv. 605 (1962). "The
principal problem which has been faced in evolving the doctrine has been precisely that of
defining the limits within which it operates." Id. at 607. "The development in this area of
the law [restitution] would be more uniform and consistent, with less overlap and confusion,
if the actions and remedies had an accepted framework within which to expand, rather than
growing pell-mell in all directions." Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1173-
74 (footnote omitted).
113. Seavey and Scott described the historical development of torts and contracts as
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oped, and because one of the elements of restitution is justice, or
"unjustness"'14 to be more precise but less grammatical, a few
commentators have criticized restitution as overbroad." 5 This con-
follows:
Unfortunately, the profession thought in terms of procedure and it was not until
shortly before the beginning of the nineteenth century that we find treatises which
in any way can be said to represent much more than collections of cases arranged in
accordance with the forms of action. Contracts had but a few pages in Blackstone,
and not until 1807 did a comprehensive treatment appear. . . . Not until 1859 was
the collective name of "Torts" given in a treatise to the wrongs for which actions of
trespass and trespass on the case were permitted in a great variety of situations.
Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 33 (footnote omitted). Goff and Jones said that "[i]n the
past restitution was considered to be no more than a heterogeneous collection of unrelated
topics." R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 73, at 5 (footnote omitted). They also noted:
At one time a similar charge was levelled against the law of tort: "We are in-
clined to think that tort is not a proper subject for a law book" see 5 Am. L. Rev.
340-341 (1871) [O.W. Holmes, Jr.], reviewing an abridged edition of Addison's
Torts. Three years later Holmes came "to recogni[z]e there were satisfactory rea-
sons, both historical and analytical, for including the subject in the corpus juris";
Mark De Wolfe Howe, Mr. Justice Holmes, The Proving Years, 1870-1882, pp. 65,
184.
Id. at n.10.
114. Not only is "unjustness" an element of the cause of action of restitution, but the
concept of justice permeates any discussion of the topic of restitution. Seavey & Scott, in
their explanation of the Restatement of Restitution said:
Lord Mansfield seems first to have recognized the fundamental principle of restitu-
tion in an opinion remarkable for its insight ... in which he stated that "the gist of
this kind of action (the action of general assumpait) is that the defendant upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to
refund the money" [citing Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005 (1760)].
These [described] cases and numerous others where relief is properly given in-
dicate that a theory of restitution is essential to dealing justly between the parties.
Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 33, 35-36.
Professor Douthwaite stated:
What is the relation between the quasi-contractual suit in assumpsit and the
equitable suit to impress a constructive trust? The answer is this: Of old, both com-
mon law and chancery judges came upon situations of unjust enrichment where jus-
tice cried out for some remedial relief not within the existing framework.
Douthwaite, supra note 90, at 1074. Professor Teller stated that "[restitution] is a vehicle
for effectuating justice in numerous situations where accustomed remedial categories may
prove inadequate." Teller, supra note 106, at 40 (footnote omitted). He added that
"[e]nlarging the measure of justice was the grand design." Id. at 46.
115. The Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement noted that "[a]t times the courts
have expressed discomfort with wide generalizations about restitution. A statement of prin-
ciple about 'unjust enrichment' leaves the expression to be defined or explained, it cannot
serve as a precise guide to decisions." RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 comment
d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983). Professor Friedmann said:
The concept of unjust enrichment is notoriously difficult to define. It has on
occasion been regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general
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cern with overbreadth may have contributed to the underutiliza-
tion of restitution.
Criticism that restitution is too broad not only ignores the fact
that restitution is in earlier stages of development than other areas
of the law, but also ignores the analysis of jurists such as Learned
Hand and Seavey and Scott, the Reporters of the Restatement of
Restitution. Learned Hand, responding to criticism of Professor
legal principle, with concern expressed that its adoption might undermine legal sta-
bility, confuse legal thinking, and jeopardize clear, systematic organization of the
law.
Friedmann, supra note 72, at 504-05 (footnotes omitted).
Goff and Jones stated that "[iut has been said that the principle of unjust enrichment is
too vague to be of any practical value." R. Goff & G. Jones, supra note 73, at 11. Another
commentator noted that "[i]t has been contended that 'unjust enrichment' is an excessively
vague concept upon which to base a category of the law, that it is so broad as to be mean-
ingless." Comment, Concept and Terms, supra note 72, at 1175. Professor Oesterle con-
cluded his book review of Professor Palmer's treatise by stating:
While most recognize and applaud the separation of the principles of unjust enrich-
ment from the early foundations, the irony of the evolution is that only the restric-
tive vestiges of these foundations have been systematically disregarded; those ves-
tiges that support broad relief-overbroad in new contexts-remain and are
uncritically accepted.
Oesterle, supra note 73, at 364 (footnote omitted).
Some commentators who complain about restitution's breadth have quoted Professor
Dawson's comment in the introduction of his book, Unjust Enrichment, "that a general
principle prohibiting enrichment through another's loss appears first as a convenient expla-
nation of specific results .... Yet once the idea has been formulated as a generalization, it
has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock." J. DAw-
SON, supra note 89, at 8, quoted in Oesterle, supra note 73, at 364 n.117; Friedmann, supra
note 72, at 505 n.3. To the extent anyone uses this statement as a reason to dismiss restitu-
tion, that person would have missed the premise of Professor Dawson's book that "any high-
ly developed legal system needs restitution remedies and cannot get on without them." J.
DAWSON, supra note 89, at 11. Professor Dawson also said that "most mature systems of law
have found it necessary to provide, outside the fields of contract and civil wrongs, for the
restoration of benefits on grounds of unjust enrichment." Id. (footnote omitted). Professor
Sullivan said: "The appeal of a legal rule requiring the disgorgement of gains unjustly ac-
quired or retained is so compelling that scholars from classical times to our own era may be
cited in its support." Sullivan, supra note 72, at 1.
In his book, Professor Dawson discussed analytic problems in the area of restitution,
but not from the point of view that restitution should be abandoned or its use restricted,
but rather that it should be better analyzed so that it can be given wider application. The
problems with restitution that Professor Dawson describes involve voluntarily conferring a
benefit, management of the affairs of another, and mistake. J. DAwsoN, supra note 89, at
127-44. None of those problems is relevant to the application of unjust enrichment for a
discriminatory denial of partnership. Professor Dawson's point is not that restitution should
not be extended, but that it should be extended more than it is. He said: "We have only the
practical limitations of our own working method and are accordingly less generous than we
could otherwise afford to be." Id. at 127.
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Keener's 1893 treatise on quasi-contract,"'6 stated that "Professor
Keener's principle is logically perfect and of a kind far from anom-
alous."117  He pointed out that if unjust enrichment is vague, so too
are the concepts of the "ordinary prudent man" and "enjoyment"
of land."' Seavey and Scott also noted that the concepts of
"promises" in contract law and "wrong" and "harm" in tort law
are no more narrow than the concept of restitution.119 They noted
116. See Abbot, supra note 109, at 209-27 (criticizing W. KENsER, A TREATISE ON TmH
LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893)).
117. Hand, supra note 108, at 257.
118. Id. at 250. Learned Hand stated:
I believe that reference to indefinite standards, such as that of conscience, is a com-
mon characteristic of legal rules. Take, for example, the rule of responsibility for
unlawful acts, that none of their results create legal liability except those against
which an ordinarily prudent man would have provided under the same circum-
stances. Surely the standard of what such results are in any given case is quite as
incapable of precise definition as that of what acts are unjust.
Or consider the rule governing the extent to which one man may injure the
property of another in the enjoyment of his own .... The standard is really no
other than that by which the interference of each with the enjoyment of his neigh-
bors, balanced with his own enjoyment, results in the maximum of freedom, a rule
quite as incapable of clear definition as that of injustice.
Id.
119. Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 36. "If it is alleged, as it frequently has been,
that [restitution's] basic premise is so broad as to be meaningless, it may be answered that
the same is equally true of the generalizations made with reference to contracts and torts."
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Seavey later reiterated:
The generality of [restitution's] premises has led some writers and judges to dispar-
age its usefulness. But, as a principle, it is no more vague than the tort generality
that one must pay for the harm he negligently causes another. . . . [W]e find its
principles not very difficult of application by one familiar with Anglo-American the-
ories of justice. It has some trick phrases, but they are not as technical as "consider-
ation" in the law of contracts nor as ambiguous as "legal cause" in torts.
Seavey, supra note 69, at 257.
Goff and Jones stated:
It has been said that the principle of unjust enrichment is too vague to be of
any practical value. Nevertheless, most rubrics of the law disclose, on examination,
an underlying principle which is almost invariably so general as to be incapable of
any precise definition. Moreover, in a search for unifying principles at this level we
should not expect to find any precise "common formula," but rather an abstract
proposition of justice which is "both an aspiration and a standard for judgment."
Unjust enrichment is no more vague than the tortious principle that a man must
pay for harm which he negligently causes another, or the contractual principle that
pacta sunt servanda. The search for principle should not be confused with the defi-
nition of concepts.
R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 73, at 11 (footnotes omitted); see also Williams, Language
and the Law-lI, 61 LAW Q. REv. 179, 193 (1945); Comment, Concept and Terms, supra
note 72, at 1175-76.
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that what was required in tort and contract law was merely "a
large number of individual rules to determine when relief will be
given .... The situation is the same in the case of the fundamen-
tal conception of restitution. It requires an extensive set of individ-
ual rules to spell out what is meant by 'unjust' .... ."1o In fact,
courts have developed a number of rules to define unjust enrich-
ment.1 21 These rules can be easily applied to a variety of situations,
including those not previously remedied by restitution. As Profes-
sor Dawson stated, "there is nothing in our present conceptions
that prevents an appropriate unjust enrichment remedy from be-
ing used in any field. 1 1 22 He added:
My own conclusion is that restitution remedies in our law
have a roving commission. The generalizations now built around
them and the techniques they provide have implications that
reach in every direction, in unsuspected ways. No area is marked
off as exempt. We have not yet absorbed all the contributions
they have made or foreseen those still in the making.2"
Professor Douthwaite noted that "[r]estitutionary problems arise
in a bedazzling variety of situations.
'124
The purpose of this article is not to explore the outer limits of
restitution but to describe one area of the law in which restitution
has been unnecessarily underutilized. A discriminatory denial of
partnership fits easily into at least one portion of the framework of
restitution that has been widely accepted. Thus, restitution en-
ables a plaintiff to prove and remedy the wrong that the court in
120. Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 36.
121. See infra note 161. The Second Restatement provides: "Repeated and consistent
applications of the principle [of unjust enrichment] can, however, give support to its further
application in like cases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESrrruroN § 1 comment d (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1983). Goff and Jones said: "In fact as one might expect, close study of the law
of restitution reveals as with contract and tort, a highly developed and reasonably system-
atic complex of rules." R. GoFF & G. JONES, supra note 73, at 13. The authors added that
"[the cases] suggest that the law is now sufficiently mature for the [English] courts to recog-
nize a generali[z]ed right to restitution .... The principle of unjust enrichment is capable
of elaboration." Id. English law, unlike American law, does not explicitly recognize such a
right. See id.; see also 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.1, at 2, 5-6; J. DAWSON, supra note
89, at 20-21.
122. J. DAwSON, supra note 89, at 113.
123. Id. at 117. Professor Dawson also said that "[a]t every point ... one finds the
same push for expansion [of the doctrine of restitution]." Id. at 145. He noted that restitu-
tion is expanded by liberal application of concepts of fraud, innocent misrepresentation,
materiality, mistake and duress. See id. at 145-46.
124. G. DoumrrwArrm, supra note 72, § 1.1 at 3.
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Hishon left unremedied by holding Title VII inapplicable even if
discrimination was proven.
125
IV. RESTITUTION APPLIED TO A DISCRIMINATORY DENIAL OF
PARTNERSHIP
A. The Defendant Has Been Enriched by Having Received a
Benefit
Since restitution provides relief when a defendant is unjustly
enriched by having received a benefit at the plaintiff's expense,1""
it follows that recovery involves disgorging the defendant's benefit.
Professor Dawson stated:
[I]t is the presence of some kind of gain-loss equation that ex-
plains the extraordinary progress of the unjust enrichment idea in
most of its modern application. For persons who have suffered
loss, the loss alone is bad enough. But when it has produced an
identifiable gain in another person, the sense of loss is greatly
aggravated. 
1 7
In restitution a defendant can benefit by receiving money, goods,
services, and a variety of other gains. The Restatement of Restitu-
tion answers its question "what constitutes a benefit," by stating:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other
possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or
choses in action, performs services beneficial to or at the request
of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way
adds to the other's security or advantage. 
12
125. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). Restitution is, of course, a matter of state, not federal, law.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
127. Dawson, supra note 89, at 177.
128. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 comment b (1937); see also RESTATEMENr (Ssc-
ONw) OF RESTITUTION § 1 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (concept of benefit is expansi-
ble and remains flexible). Professor Dawson also said:
It is broadly true of the modem remedy in the United States that there are no
distinctions based on the form or nature of the gain received .... The benefit may
consist of the acquisition or use of chattels, services rendered or acts performed, the
use of ideas, or the discharge of an obligation. The list is not yet closed.
J. DAwsoN, supra note 89, at 22. Professor Dawson later added:
The "gain" can consist of money, the discharge of an obligation, the use of a physi-
cal asset or an idea, or a desired course of action by another human being-the
latter being described as "services" or "bargained for performance" and thereby
made to seem almost as real as land or a shovel.
Dawson, supra note 89, at 176-77.
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In the case of a discriminatory denial of partnership, the law
firm's benefit is the net monetary gain from the proceeds of the
"billable hours" the associate worked. Typically,"'9 the hours an
associate works are exchanged directly by a law firm for a specific
amount of money that is easily measured. The law firm bills a cli-
ent for each productive hour that the associate devotes to that cli-
ent's work.13 0 The firm pays the associate an annual salary.131 The
value of the associate's "billable hours" generally exceeds by a sub-
stantial amount the associate's salary, related overhead, and other
benefits from the firm not reimbursed by clients. This excess is the
firm's net benefit from the associate's work.13 2 Thus, when a firm
In the case of services provided to a defendant, whether a plaintiff can recover the value
of the services in excess of the defendant's benefit is subject to debate. See infra note 148.
As long as the defendant has received an "actual benefit," however, the concept of benefit in
restitution is widely accepted and uncontroversial. See Childres & Garamella, supra note 72,
at 435-36. The authors note that restitution is "recovery of the actual benefit conferred
upon the defending party.. . ... Id. at 435. See generally Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the
Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit, 26 IND. L.J. 1 (1950); Sullivan, supra
note 72 (review of types of benefits in restitution).
129. In any specific case utilizing the theory of restitution for a discriminatory denial of
partnership, the plaintiff would need to prove the structure and billing practices of the law
firm. Because this information is relevant to the action in restitution, the information is
obtainable through discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
130. The number of hours that the firm bills a client is not necessarily the number of
hours the associate worked. A firm may not bill a client for all the hours worked if a partner
believes that the project did not warrant that many hours or that the associate was ineffi-
cient. If, however, the firm did bill for the hours but the client did not pay all or part of the
bill, although the firm did not benefit, the plaintiff may still recover under a quantum me-
ruit theory of restitution. See infra note 148.
131. See C. EPsTEiN, WOMEN iN LAW 179 (1981) (associates are salaried).
132. This benefit is in addition to the money the partners earn from their own "billable
hours." Salary and overhead related to an associate's work are deducted on the theory that
the plaintiff must tender to the defendant the benefit that she received from the defendant.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACT, § 384 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF RESTrrU-
'noN § 19 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983); infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. These rules
provide symmetry to prevent plaintiff's unjust enrichment.
What constitutes plaintiff's benefit is a matter of proof. Salary would include fringe
benefits. Related overhead might include: (1) the plaintiff's share of the cost of support staff
and facilities and rent not separately billed to clients; (2) the plaintiff's share of the propor-
tionate salaries devoted to office administration not billed to clients of those people who
spend time running the firm and generating business; and (3) the plaintiff's share of the cost
of training seminars or time the plaintiff received from others in the firm that was not billed
to clients. To the extent that the overhead and other related benefits have been reimbursed
by clients, plaintiff should not be required to give the defendant, who breached the contract
by discriminating, a double recovery. See generally Kosian v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 254
Cal. App. 2d 657, 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1967). In addition, to the extent that a plaintiff is
enriched by not deducting benefits reimbursed by clients, she is not enriched at the defen-
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discriminates or claims the right to discriminate in choosing part-
ners, the hours and efforts of an associate were for naught as far as
her future with that law firm is concerned, but not as far as the
partners are concerned.
Using the Hishon example of an associate who worked for a
firm for six years before the alleged discriminatory partnership re-
jection and hypothetical annual salary, overhead, billing rate, and
hours worked, a law firm's hypothetical benefit can be seen in the
following three tables. Each table uses the same hypothetical sal-
ary, overhead and billing rates, changing only the number of hours
worked. Thus, the tables show how the partnership benefit in-
creases as the associate works more hours.
As Table 1 demonstrates, if an associate works 1600 billable
hours per year, the firm receives a net benefit of $270,000 over six
years.
dant's expense since the defendant has been reimbursed. Unjust enrichment requires en-
richment to be at the other party's expense. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
The Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement provides that a plaintiff need not
tender a benefit that is not produced, "at least in part either (a) at a cost to the defendant
or (b) by a performance owed or expected by one of the parties in connection with the
exchange." RZsTATMEmiNr (SscoND) OF RZSsrTIrON § 21 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1983). Subsection (b) does not discuss the situation when a third party has reimbursed the
defendant, and for the reasons stated above, should not apply to such a situation. Comment
a of § 21 states that a plaintiff may be required to account for "new technical competence or
production capacity through his own performance." Id. § 21 comment a. To the extent that
comment implies that a plaintiff should account for her increased competence that is gained
by virtue of working for six years and that is the result of her own efforts, however, it is
inconsistent with the well-settled theory that "receipt of gain is not unjust enrichment to
the extent that the recipient generated it by his own rightful contribution of effort, capital,
or skill. . . " Id. § 1 comment i; see infra note 143. To the extent the firm paid for training
seminars for the plaintiff or provided in-house training to her that was not reimbursed by
clients, however, the plaintiff should account.
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Table I
1600 "Billable Hours" Worked Per Year
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Salary $25,000 $30,000 $35,000 $40,000 $45,000 $50,000
Related
overhead"' +$25,000 $30,000 $35,000 $40,000 $45,000 $50,000
Total $50,000 $60,000 $70,000 $80,000 $90,000 $100,000
Hourly billing
rate'" $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100
Number of hours
billed xl,600 x1,600 x1,600 x1,600 x1,600 xl,600
Total billing $80,000 96,000 112,000 128,000 144,000 160,000
Salary and related
overhead -$50,000 -60,000 -70,000 -80,000 -90,000 -100,000
Law firm's net
benefit $30,000 +36,000 +42,000 +48,000 +54,000 +60,000 =$270,000
(Total net benefit)
An average associate, however, bills 1600 hours per year.
Many associates who actively compete for partnership, motivated
by the assurance that they are eligible, bill far more than 1600
hours per year. 135 Thus, the benefit to the law firm becomes con-
siderably higher. Table 2 shows that if an associate billed 2,000
hours per year, the law firm would retain a net benefit of $450,000.
Finally, as Table 3 demonstrates, if an associate were exceptionally
hard working and billed 2,880 hours per year (60 hours a week for
48 weeks), the partnership would receive a net benefit of $846,000.
133. The hypothetical overhead is 100 percent of salary. See, e.g., Pollock, Applying
the "Principal" Principle, THE AmERicAN LAWYER, July, 1982, at 8. Actual overhead may
not be a fixed percentage of salary. It may decline as a percentage of salary as salary
increases.
134. The hypothetical billing rate is "based on the traditional formula of twice the an-
nual salary divided by $1,000 an hour." Pollock, supra note 133, at 8.
135. Ms. Epstein stated:
A Price-Waterhouse study found that the average Wall Street associate billed cli-
ents for 1,667 hours of work in 1976, but this is considered sluggish. Associates at
various firms say they are expected to bill 2,000 hours a year. .-. . Many lawyers
bill far in excess of 2,000 hours and a woman lawyer I have kept in touch with who
was billing 200 hours a month in 1976, in 1980 said she had been billing 300 hours a
month for one three-month period on a particularly demanding case.
C. EPSTEIN, supra note 131, at 209 (footnotes omitted). Ms. Epstein quoted one attorney in
a large law firm who said: "[T]here are people who spend every night here, and every week-






















2,000 "Billable Hours" Worked Per Year
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
$50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100
x2,000 x2,000 x2,000 x2,000 x2,000 x2,000
$100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000
-$50,000 -60,000 -70,000 -80,000 -90,000 -100,000
$50,000 +60,000 +70,000 +80,000 +90,000 +100,000 -$450,000
(Total net benefit)
Table 3
2,880 "Billable Hours" Worked Per Year
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
$50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100
x2,880 x2,880 x2,880 x2,880 x2,880 x2,880
$144,000 172,800 201,600 230,400 259,200 288,000
-$50,000 -60,000 -70,000 -80,000 -90,000 -100,000
$94,000 +112,800 +131,600 +150,400 +169,200 +188,000 -$846,000
(Total net benefit)
It is not uncommon for an associate seeking partnership to bill
2000 or more hours per year. 13 6 Some associates may even bill more
than 2800 hours, motivated not only by the desire to do a profes-
sional job, but also by the competition for partnership. Thus, the
tables may understate the benefit to the law firm from an ambi-
tious associate.
In addition, in many law firms associates work more than six
years before the partnership decision. 3 7 Thus, for each extra year
worked as an associate, the total benefit to the partnership will
increase. The benefit will increase by well over $100,000 per year if
an associate works 2880 billable hours per year. If such an associ-
ate worked 10 years before being discriminatorily denied partner-
ship, the benefit to the firm could be over $1,500,000.s The tables
136. See supra note 135.
137. "Promotion in Wall Street firms is similar to the tenure system in academia.
Young lawyers serve as associates for six to ten years while they await final appraisal, lead-
ing to partnership or departure from the firm." C. EPSTmN, supra note 131, at 202.
138. If the last four years were all at the same salary and billing rate as year six,
Restitution and Discrimination
may again, therefore, understate the benefit of an associate's work
to the partners of many firms.
The tables show the benefit to the law partnership based upon
the total number of billable hours an associate works. As will be
discussed below,""9 the benefit that must be disgorged is the bene-
fit unjustly retained. Therefore, the tables should show only the
hours worked as a result of the promise of eligibility for partner-
ship. The hours that would have been worked without this promise
should be subtracted. In order to have a figure to subtract, the
plaintiff would have had to have been willing to work for a firm in
which she would not have been eligible for partnership. The tables
assume that she had other offers of employment and would not
have worked for a firm where she was ineligible for partnership;
therefore, the amount subtracted is zero.
An associate's recovery is not necessarily lessened by the hours
she worked on pro bono publico'4e or office administration mat-
ters.1 4 ' First, the value of "nonbillable" hours could be recovered
under a quantum meruit theory of restitution. 42 Second, unless
the pro bono client was represented by the firm at the request of
the associate, the client was represented by the choice of the firm.
The associate assigned by the firm to pro bono tasks or office ad-
ministration work saves the time of another associate at the same
level for billable work. Benefit in restitution can include "an ex-
pense saved by the defendant."
M4
$752,000 (4 x $188,000) added to the total benefit for six years of $846,000 results in a ten
year total of $1,598,000.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 159-200.
140. Pro bono publico work is work that a law firm chooses to do at little or no charge
as a public service.
141. "Office administration" work is generally work for the partnership, such as re-
search on legal issues of interest to the firm or work on firm committees.
142. See infra note 148.
143. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 10. Professor Sullivan stated:
Although a venerable strain of American case law exists that defines benefit
narrowly so as to preclude recovery where the plaintiff has not proven tangible gain
by the defendant, most jurisdictions in recent times have developed a much broader
definition of benefit. The Virginia Supreme Court decision in Raven Red Ash Coal
Co. v. Ball [185 Va. 534, 39 S.E. 2d 231 (1946)] typifies this recent trend.., an
expense saved by the defendant.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Restatement of Restitution provides that a person "confers a
benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the other
from expense or loss." RSTATzMENT OF RzSTIUON, § 1 comment b (1937); see RSSTATE-
MENr (SEcoND) OF RESTrruTiON § 1 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983); see also 1 G.
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The monetary benefit that a firm receives from an associate, as
illustrated above, is not direct in the sense that an associate
handed the law firm $500,000 or more, which the law firm must
now return. Such directness, however, is not an element of restitu-
tion since restitution "does not mean that the gain to the defen-
dant need be equated to the loss to the plaintiff ... ."144 The Re-
statement of Restitution states that "if a person receives
something other than money and exchanges it for money, he may
be under a duty of restitution for the money thus received
. . . .- In the case of a law firm, an associate's work is measured
by hours. The firm has acquired the associate's hours and directly
"exchanged" them for money. This situation is analogous to one in
which a defendant who acquires a chattel from the plaintiff and
sells it becomes liable in restitution to the plaintiff for the
proceeds. 4 6
PALMER, supra note 64, § 2.12, at 162 (saving of expense applied in modern decisions to
measure unjust enrichment in wrongful use of a trade secret). See generally Olwell v. Nye &
Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). In Olwell, a machine was converted and
used by the defendant. The court measured recovery not by the rental value of the machine
but by what the defendant saved by not having to employ workers. Id. Professor Palmer
questioned whether this measure of recovery was proper on the ground that it could be
viewed as "awarding to the plaintiff values that were the product of the defendant's own
enterprise." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 2.12, at 161. He noted that "the point is suffi-
ciently demonstrated by the wide discrepancy between the probable market value of the use
of the machine, and the amount of recovery authorized under the court's formula." Id. That
criticism is inapplicable in the case of an associate's hours. When a firm bills the hours an
associate works to a client, the firm does not add its work product to those hours, nor does it
add its work product to another associate's hours that are billed in lieu of the time spent by
an associate working on pro bono matters. The ingenuity and time spent are the associate's.
In addition, the market value of the hours saved is the same as the market value of the use
of the hours, so the discrepancy of Olwell does not exist. The Olwell case is discussed in
Douthwaite, supra note 89, at 1076, as a case that measures the value of the benefit by its
value to the defendant rather than by its "objectively regarded" or market value. The value
to the law firm and the market value of the associate's time are generally the same and are
measured by what clients pay the firm for the hours of an associate.
144. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 2.10, at 133.
145. RESTATEMNT OF RESTrUTON, § 150 comment b, at 597-98 (1937).
146. Professor Palmer stated that if the benefit "consisted of the transfer of goods or
services, the usual measure of recovery is their fair market value. If the goods have been
sold by the tortfeasor, the plaintiff may recover the amount of proceeds." 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 64, § 2.12, at 157-58. Early quasi-contractual theory permitted a plaintiff to re-
cover only if the defendant had sold the chattel, not if he or she had consumed it. See J.
DAWSON, supra note 89, at 22; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 2.2, at 53-55; RsTATzmRNr OF
RESTrTTON § 128 comment h (1937). This limitation was based upon the fiction that the
plaintiff had agreed to the defendant's sale of the chattel with the expectation of receiving
the proceeds. D. DoBBS, LAW OF Rrmnires § 5.15, at 414-15 (1973). But the "agreement" in
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An associate's hours are also analogous to services. The con-
cept of benefit in restitution encompasses the value of services pro-
vided to the defendant at his request.14 7 Generally, the difficulties
with restitutionary theory and requested services involve situations
in which the services did not financially benefit the defendant or in
which the defendant's benefit was less than the market value of
the services. In those situations, the question becomes whether re-
covery is measured by the value of the services to the defendant or
by the reasonable value of plaintiff's services.14 8 In the case of a
quasi-contract is purely fictional, see supra text accompanying notes 96-97, and restitution
is now generally viewed as available whether the defendant sold or consumed the chattel.
See J. DAwsoN, supra note 89, at 22; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 2.2, at 55; RESTATEMENT
OF RESTrrtTION § 128 comment h (1937); Sullivan, supra note 72, at 5-7. Section 128 of the
Restatement of Restitution provides: "A person who has tortiously obtained, retained, used,
or disposed of the chattels of another, is under a duty of restitution to the other." RESTATE-
MENT OF Rs=TrruON § 128 comment h (1937). Since the law firm "sold" the associate's
hours for money, the associate would recover in unjust enrichment even under restrictive
theories of restitution.
147. See, e.g., RESTATzmzNT OF RESTrTuTION §§ 40, 134 (1937) (Reporters' Notes at 25);
RESTATEmzNT (SzCOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 370 comment a (1981); see also 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 4.2, at 135. With respect to services, Professor Keener said:
If restitution be the theory upon which the plaintiff recovers, when that which he
gave the defendant was money, and if the amount paid is the measure of recovery in
such cases, it would seem to follow logically that where the plaintiff renders ser-
vices ... and the defendant fails to perform the contract, the plaintiff can if he
desires sue in indebitatus assumpSit. Such is the law. Not only should this result
follow, but it should follow that the measure of the plaintiff's recovery should be
not what the defendant contracted to pay, but the actual value received by defen-
dant from the plaintiff. When a plaintiff sues in a count for money had and re-
ceived, what he recovers is not the money that he paid, but an equivalent amount;
and the law says that he is entitled to recover an equivalent amount, for the reason
that it is unjust for the defendant to keep what the plaintiff gave him without per-
forming the contract on his side. But if this be true of money, why should it not be
equally true in the case of services .... Why should not the plaintiff recover on
the theory of restitution in value, and not upon the theory of compensation, as
much where services have been rendered ... as in the case of money paid, since
what the plaintiff receives is not the money paid but its equivalent?
W. KEENER, supra note 72, at 300 (footnote omitted). Childres and Garamella stated that
"[t]he defendant has received the plaintiff's property or its value and should be made to
return it since he possesses no legitimate claim to the property or its value, whether in
employment, sales, or the various 'services' cases." Childres & Garamella, supra note 72, at
442 (footnote omitted). Professor Teller writes that "[i]f the jailer or the applicable division
of government receives money from the contractor for the services of a person unlawfully
imprisoned, restitution may be had for the amount received." Teller, supra note 106, at 51.
148. For example, Childres and Garamella noted that the law of restitution sometimes
covers both "actions to recover actual benefits conferred and actions to recover the reasona-
ble value of expenses and services." Childres & Garamella, supra note 72, at 435 (footnote
omitted). The latter is referred to as quantum meruit. Id. at 435-36 n.14. Professor Palmer
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law firm, with the exception of non-client work and unpaid bills,1 4'
neither of those difficulties is present because the benefit to the
firm and the value of the associate's services are identical and eas-
ily measured by looking at the bill that the firm sent to the cli-
ent.150 The client's bill when paid is the benefit received by the
firm and, by definition, the "market value" of the services of the
associate at that firm.1 51
stated that: "The two most important meanings [of benefit] are, first, that there has been an
addition to the defendant's wealth or an increase in his estate; and second, that a perform-
ance requested by the defendant has been rendered." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, J 1.8, at
44-45.
Childres and Garamella noted that in cases in which the defendant has breached a
contract before the plaintiff has completed performance, under quantum meruit the plain-
tiff can sometimes recover the value of the services performed in reliance upon the contract
even if that value exceeds both the contract price and the value to the defendant. They
believed that this upset risk allocations inherent in contracts and that such reliance dam-
ages should be recoverable only as contract damages, limited by the terms of the contract
and considerations of economies of scale. Childres & Garamella, supra note 72, at 441, 444-
54. They distinguished this problem from restitution. Where the defendant has received an
"actual benefit," they would allow recovery of that benefit even if it exceeds the contract
price. Id. at 441-44. On the other hand, Professor Palmer would permit recovery in both
situations. "In general, the benefit is the requested performance .... If the performance
consists of services, . . . a court should order restitution measured by the fair value of the
part performance, even though that was in excess of the contract price." 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 1.8, at 45 (footnote omitted); see also id. § 4.2, at 370-77.
Professor Dawson maintains that "gain to the wrongdoers can exist without any show-
ing of ultimate profit or utility to him, provided the interest invaded is one that others
commonly pay for or might conceivably pay for." Dawson, supra note 89, at 178.
Professor Perillo's thesis is that the concept of benefit as an actual gain unnecessarily
restricts the applicability of quasi-contract as a cause of action and does not always allow
plaintiff to recover for "unjust impoverishment." Perillo, supra note 94, at 1220. He suggests
that the goal should be "to determine the extent the status quo ante will be restored." Id. at
1224; see also Comment, The Necessity of Conferring a Benefit for Recovery in Quasi-
Contract, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 1259 (1968) (liability in quasi-contract should be based on either
unjust enrichment of the defendant or unjust loss of the plaintiff).
149. For unpaid bills, an associate could recover only under a traditional quantum me-
ruit theory of restitution for the reasonable value of her services, which is the dollar value as
billed. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 1.8, at 45, § 4.2, at 370-79; see also supra note 148.
For nonclient work plaintiff could recover under either a theory of quantum meruit or of
savings to the defendant. See supra notes 130, 140-43, 148.
150. For law firms that do not itemize the bill they send their clients, the amount of the
bill attributed to the work of the associate would have to be determined from internal work
papers.
151. While the billing rate of an associate's hours reflects the prestige of the firm, it
also reflects the quality of the work of partners and associates of the firm. Just as when
someone who wrongfully sells a chattel is liable in restitution for the proceeds of the sale, so
too is the firm liable in restitution for the proceeds of the associate's hours. The fact that
the reputation of the seller of the chattel enabled him to sell it does not diminish the value
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Upon superficial reflection one might think that the salary of
an associate is the reasonable market value of the associate's ser-
vices, but that would ignore the fact that salary is only part of an
associate's compensation. The other part is the promise that the
associate is eligible to compete for partnership."5 2 Thus, salary
alone underestimates the value of the associate's services.153
There is an appropriate symmetry in the application of resti-
tution to remedy a discriminatory denial of partnership in a law
firm. The more qualified and productive the associate who was dis-
criminated against is, the greater the benefit to the firm and the
more likely the adverse partnership decision was based on discrim-
ination. Thus, the more grievous the wrong of discrimination
against her in her chosen career, the greater the recovery under
of the chattel. Nor would a law firm argue that the hours of the associate are not worth the
amount for which the firm bills its clients. Since restitution measures the defendant's bene-
fit, what an associate would have earned as a sole practitioner is irrelevant.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 166-87.
153. Law firms at times refer to the benefit they receive from the billable hours of
associates as "profit." See generally C. EPsTEIN, supra note 131, at 179. This benefit is not
the type of "profit" that may not be recoverable by a plaintiff in restitution. First, as Pro-
fessor Palmer noted, "[t]here is ambiguity... in the term 'profits."' 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 2.12, at 159. He added that "[o]ne of the recurring problems in the law of restitu-
tion is to determine whether, or the extent to which, the defendant's gain is the product not
solely of the plaintiff's interest but also of contributions made by the defendant." Id. at 161.
When the profits are entirely or almost entirely "the fruits of defendant's labor," restitution
will be denied. Id. § 2.9, at 130 (quoting Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93
N.Y.S.2d 871, aff'd, 277 A.D. 939, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1949) (restitution not available for prof-
its from defendant's book which allegedly libeled plaintiff)). With a discriminatory denial of
partnership, however, the benefit comes from billing the associate's work by the hour at a
fixed fee, not from the firm's additional labor. Thus, the value of the associate's work is not
unrecoverable "profit." Even if it were, recovery of profits may be available when the defen-
dant's acts are tortious or in breach of a relationship of trust. See, e.g., National Merchan-
dising Corp. v. Leyden, 370 Mass. 380, 348 N.E.2d 771 (1976). See generally Douthwaite,
supra note 90; Douthwaite, Profits and Their Recovery, 15 VurL. L. Rzv. 346 (1970); York,
supra note 104. Discrimination could be analogized to tortious, or wrongful, conduct. Pro-
fessor Palmer has said that "recovery of profits may be granted because there is no other
feasible means of measuring the wrongdoer's enrichment." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, §
2.12, at 166.
Second, when commentators say that generally a plaintiff cannot recover the profits a
defendant made from breaching his contract, they are referring to a defendant who
"[i]nstead of supplying the promised performance ... uses or disposes of it for his own
benefit ... ." Id. § 4.9, at 437-38; see also Dawson, supra note 89, at 186-87. That is not
the situation with a discriminatory denial of partnership. The associate seeks to recover the
value of what she gave to the law firm, not any gain that the firm made by selling elsewhere
what it had promised to deliver to the associate. "[R]estitution of... performance in specie
or in value" is well accepted. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.9, at 451; see also Dawson,
supra note 89, at 189.
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restitution. Conversely, if the associate were unproductive, ineffi-
cient, and unqualified, the smaller the benefit, if any, to the firm,
and the more likely the adverse partnership decision was based on
the associate's lack of merit rather than her sex.
The well-qualified, productive associate, however, provided
the firm with a measurable monetary benefit. The law firm cannot
restore the status quo so that the associate can begin her career
again in a place where she is eligible to advance."" It is impossible
for the firm to return an associate's time for the past six or more
years. The partnership, however, can and should return the benefit
it has reaped at the associate's expense-the value of the associ-
ate's time1 5 -when it discriminates against the associate in select-
ing partners.
B. The Defendant's Benefit Was at Plaintiff's Expense.
The second element of restitution is that the defendant's ben-
efit is at the plaintiff's expense. Just as the defendant's benefit
need not equal the plaintiff's loss,1 5 6 "[p]ecuniary loss should not
be an essential element of the restitution claim .... "5 In the
case of a law firm, an associate's loss is her time and effort spent
competing for a partnership slot for which, unknown to her, she
was ineligible.
In the case of the associate discriminated against, not only is
the defendant's gain-the value of the associate's billable
hours-at the associate's expense, but the gain and the loss are
equivalent.158 Each hour worked by the associate was the associ-
154. See generally Note, Discrimination Suits by Professionals, supra note 84, at 112-
13.
[A] financial award alone is an inadequate judgment for many employees....
[There are a] growing number of persons, particularly female, who have deferred
professional education and begun careers in mid-life. To a minority member who
has managed to become established with a firm or corporation of any size and repu-
tation, the loss of prestige, facilities, and opportunity for growth and advancement
are immeasurable, practically speaking, because there is less opportunity or less
time left for achievement.
Id.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 159-204.
156. See supra text accompanying note 144.
157. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 3.8, at 269; see also G. DouTmwArrz, supra note 72,
§ 1.3, at 8 (Supp. 1980); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, §§ 2.6, 2.10, at 82, 133.
158. Equivalence of gain and loss has occasionally been viewed as a requirement of
restitutionary analysis, but the modern view is that equivalence is unnecessary. As Professor
Sullivan explained:
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ate's loss, measured by the value that the client paid for the hour.
That value per hour was also the benefit that the defendant
received.
C. The Defendant's Retention of the Benefit Would Be Unjust
1. Breach of Contract
Broad concepts in the law, such as "harm" in tort law and
"promise" in contract law, are defined by a series of rules devel-
oped from case law.1" 9 In restitution as well, there are a number of
well-recognized rules developed from case law to specify when a
benefit is unjustly acquired or retained and thus must be dis-
gorged.160 Total or material breach of contract is one of the many
situations in which courts have ruled that a defendant's retention
of a benefit is unjust. 6 ' A discriminatory denial of partnership
Keener and Woodward maintain that the plaintiff must prove both that the
defendant has committed a wrong and that the defendant has benefitted at the
expense of the plaintiff: "the facts must show not only a plus, but a minus quality."
Since the idea that the defendant should not be entitled to retain a benefit wrong-
fully obtained at plaintiff's expense partially underlies quasi-contract, the Keener-
Woodward view makes some sense. If the defendant's gain cannot be shown to have
caused plaintiff a loss, no basis exists for permitting recovery in quasi-contract.
Despite the Keener-Woodward conclusion that quasi-contractual recovery on
such facts would not be appropriate, the law today is otherwise. The Restatement
of Restitution, for example, intimates that plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract
does not require a showing that plaintiff's loss corresponds precisely to defendant's
gain.
Sullivan, supra note 72, at 23 (footnotes omitted). Referring to Professor Keener's "plus and
minus" statement, Professor Palmer stated: "Whatever the statement may mean, the deci-
sions amply demonstrate that economic loss to the plaintiff is not a requisite." 1 G. PALmR,
supra note 64, § 2.10, at 134. A case frequently cited by commentators held:
The point is not whether a definite something was taken away from plaintiff and
added to the treasury of defendant. The point is whether defendant unjustly en-
riched itself by doing a wrong to plaintiff in such manner and in such circumstances
that in equity and good conscience defendant should not be permitted to retain that
by which it has been enriched.
Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575, 582
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) (footnote omitted); see also Dawson, supra note 89, at 176 ("loss" need not
involve any physical diminution or subtraction from the assets of the complaining party).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
160. What all these situations have in common, beyond the three elements of restitu-
tion, is not the subject of this article. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that
restitution is applicable to remedy a discriminatory denial of partnership.
161. Professor Palmer's four volume treatise contains 23 chapters. They specify that a
defendant's benefit is unjust in certain situations involving conversion, trespass, fraud, mis-
representation, breaches of both enforceable and unenforceable contracts, mistakes, dona-
tions and bequests. See 1-4 G. PALMER, supra note 64. Professor Oesterle noted that Profes-
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when the associate was promised eligibility for partnership is such
a breach of contract.
10 2
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides in pertinent
part: "On a breach by non-performance that gives rise to a claim
for damages for total breach . . . the injured party is entitled to
restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party
by way of part performance or reliance. 16 3 When a plaintiff seeks
restitution for a breach of contract, the plaintiff is not seeking ex-
sor Palmer could have included problems of infancy, mental incapacity and undue influence.
Oesterle, supra note 73, at 340 n.23. The Restatement of Restitution contains chapters on
the applicability of restitution for, inter alia, mistake, fraud, coercion, and benefits acquired
tortiously and by request. Professor Dawson said:
The most common grounds [for restitution] are also grounds for rescission of con-
tracts, such as fraud, mistake, compulsion, undue influence, impossibility or frustra-
tion, sometimes substantial breach, and certain kinds of illegality. To these we must
add certain others: the threatened forfeiture of a contractual performance as a re-
sult of the plaintiff's own breach, the invalidity of an intended bargain for failure to
comply with formal requirements or through a want of authority in one party to
make or perform it, certain limited types of justified though unsolicited interven-
tion, and a very large and inclusive group of legal and equitable wrongs through
which gains are realized.
J. DAwsON, supra note 89, at 117-18. He added that "the catalogue is not merely heteroge-
neous; it is neither closed nor complete." Id. at 118. Professor Dawson said, in an article
written eight years later, that he would not "attempt to survey all the grounds for restitu-
tion that have been recognized in American law, for this would require a major treatise."
Dawson, supra note 89, at 175; see also Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 30-31, 34.
162. Other possible examples of restitution that could apply to a discriminatory denial
of partnership include innocent misrepresentation: the partnership represented that the as-
sociate would be eligible for partnership. Since she was not eligible because she was not
considered for partnership on account of her sex (or because the partnership claimed the
right not to consider her for partnership), the statement of eligibility was a misrepresenta-
tion. This statement would be an innocent one, however, if the partnership did not know it
would discriminate when she was hired. Analogous to misrepresentation is the doctrine of
mistake. The associate was mistaken as to her eligibility for partnership through no fault of
her own but rather through the fault of the partnership. Similarly, since the law firm stated
that the associate was eligible for partnership, and since the associate's eligibility for part-
nership was in its control, the partnership is estopped from denying eligibility.
163. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 373(1) (1981). The Second Restatement of
Restitution provides: "A breach of contract often results in unjust enrichment of the party
in breach and gives rise to a right to restitution in the other party." RsTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF REsTirtrrloN § 1 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983). Comment c adds that "[a] right to
restitution may also arise when one of the parties to a contract fails to perform as
agreed. .. ." Id. § 1 comment c. The Second Restatement of Restitution cross-references
section 373 of the Second Restatement of Contracts: "This Restatement [of Restitution]
does not deal with rights to restitution resulting from breach of contract. . . .Restitution
is awarded. . .as stated in the Restatement, Second, Contracts §§ 373 and 374. .... Nev-
ertheless, this Restatement deals with many situations in which a bargaining process or a
contract is an element." Id. § 1 comment 1.
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pectation damages normally associated with a breach of contract.
Instead, the plaintiff is seeking recovery in restitution, which has
the dual purpose of returning to the plaintiff the benefits conferred
upon the defendant and of depriving the defendant of the benefits
it obtained from the plaintiff.'" A discriminatory denial of part-
The Restatement of Restitution provides:
A person of full capacity who, pursuant to a contract with another, has per-
formed services or transferred property to the other or otherwise has conferred a
benefit upon him, is not entitled to compensation therefor other than in accordance
with the terms of such bargain... unless the other has failed to perform his part
of the bargain.
RTATEMENT OF RESTUTION § 107 (1937).
Section 373, subsection 2, of the Second Restatement of Contracts provides that resti-
tution is not available if the only remaining performance by the breaching party is payment
of a sum certain. RESTATEMzNT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRArs § 373(2) (1981); accord RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF RESTUTION § 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983). This limitation is known as
the "full performance" doctrine. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.3, at 378. In a discrim-
inatory denial of partnership, the full performance doctrine is inapplicable because the
breach is not the failure to pay a sum certain, but the failure to consider the plaintiff for
partnership. See, e.g., Coon v. Schoeneman, 476 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). In that
case, plaintiff had contracted with an owner of a lot to build 11 houses in exchange for
profits from their sale. The lot owner breached the contract with the builder, who sued for
the value of his services. Id. at 440. The court held that-
[E]ven if the profits were apportionable to each house, the amount was not liqui-
dated. It depended on the sale price and the various factors making up the cost
The case is analogous to one in which the agreed exchange of services is some-
thing other than a determinable amount of money, such as property or an interest
in the business. In that case even a plaintiff who has fully performed may recover
the reasonable value of his services rather than the value of what was promised to
him.
Id. at 443.
164. The Second Restatement of Contracts provides: "An injured party usually seeks,
through protection of either his expectation or his reliance interest, to enforce the other
party's broken promise .... However, he may, as an alternative, seek, through protection
of his restitution interest, to prevent the unjust enrichment of the other party." RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 373 comment a (1981).
Professor Palmer described the theory of restitution for breach of contract, saying, "res-
titution is not enforcement of a contract, implied or otherwise, but is based upon the pre-
vention of unjust enrichment; that when benefits are transferred pursuant to contract, the
defendant's breach frequently entitles the plaintiff to disregard the contract and recover the
value of those benefits ... ." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.3, at 386. He added that
"[r]estitution is grounded on the fact that [the injured party] conferred a benefit through
performance of the contract, in whole or in part, without receiving the promised exchange
because of the other party's breach." Id. § 4.5, at 416. He described the dual purpose of
restitution as thus: "The central aim of restitution for the defendant's breach is to recover
benefits transferred by the plaintiff in performance of the contract", as well as "to deprive
the breaching party of benefits obtained under the contract." Id. §§ 4.1-.2, at 369-70.
Professor Corbin stated:
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 34:743
nership is a total breach of a contract between the partnership and
the associate.""5
a. The Contract
The court in Hishon mentioned the possibility of a breach of
contract action"' and noted that Hishon had claimed that the firm
had promised her that "in return for satisfactory work" partner-
ship would be "forthcoming. ' '167 Most large law firms, however, do
not guarantee that partnership will be forthcoming to any associ-
ate when she is hired. The typical law firm promises that the asso-
ciate is eligible to compete for partnership."'8 In an analogous situ-
ation, courts uphold promises of competitions as contractual offers
that, upon acceptance by performance, become binding con-
An unjust enrichment occurs in another large class of cases where there has been an
agreement between two parties and one has performed his part without receiving
the consideration to which the agreement entitled him. The failure of consideration
consists of a non-performance by the defendant of his part of the agreement.
Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, supra note 104, at 533. He added: "Where the de-
fendant has broken his contract in a vital matter without excuse, the plaintiff has two reme-
dies-ex contractu for damages, or quasi ex contractu by rescinding the contract and con-
tenting himself with restitution of what the defendant has received, or its value." Id. at 542
(footnote omitted). Professor Dawson said: "Restitution on the ground of substantial
breach, like restitution on other grounds, can be accomplished through specific reme-
dies .... But by far the most common remedy is the quasi-contract money judgment."
Dawson, supra note 89, at 189. Professor Sullivan remarked that "[w]hen a breaching party
is shown to have received a tangible benefit, courts have been willing to force disgorgement
on quasi-contractual grounds." Sullivan, supra note 72, at 7 (footnote omitted).
165. If the promise of eligibility for partnership were not viewed as a part of an express
contract, it could be viewed as a promise that induces substantial reliance. See RzSTATE-
MENTr (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Section 373, which provides that restitution is
available for a total breach of an express contract, also provides that "[t]he rule stated in
this Section applies tolall enforceable promises, including those that are enforceable because
of reliance." Id. § 373 comment a; see also 1 A. CORBmN, COmN ON CONTRACTs § 205, at 246-
47 (1963).
166. The court stated:
We do have serious concerns about any representations made to the appellant
regarding her future consideration for partnership .... If in fact these representa-
tions were deceptively made, then perhaps an action in breach of contract or mis-
representation may provide a more appropriate vehicle for the appellant to drive
toward a legal remedy.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d at 1029 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 1028.
168. The promise that the associate is eligible to compete for partnership is generally
one that will not be completed within a year. It is not governed by the statute of frauds
because when it is time for the partnership to consider an associate for partnership, the
associate will have completely performed her portion of the contract. See RzsTATzUENT
(SECOND) OF CONRACTS § 130 (1981).
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tracts.1" Similarly, a promise of an "opportunity to bid" to be the
contractor for a construction project is an enforceable promise.1
7
0
The promise that an associate is on a "partnership-track" may
be explicitly stated17 1 or it may be implied.17 2 In response to a
question by the associate, the partnership may even explicitly
promise that it does not discriminate in choosing partners. The
typical firm also promises to pay the associate a salary, including
fringe benefits and possibly bonuses, and to provide support staff
and facilities. The corresponding promises of the associate are that
the associate will join the firm, possibly foregoing other offers of
employment, and will work sedulously, possibly foregoing other
activities.
b. The Promise of Eligibility for Partnership is Material
The Restatement of Restitution describes the breaching party
as one who "has failed to perform his part of the bargain," while
169. See, e.g., Hertz v. Montgomery Publishing Co., 9 Ala. App. 178, 62 So. 564 (1913)
(contest by newspaper for gathering newspaper subscriptions); Youngblood v. Daily and
Weekly Signal Tribune, 15 La. App. 212, 131 So. 604 (1930) (contest by newspaper for gath-
ering newspaper subscriptions); Palmer v. Cent. Bd. of Educ. of Pittsburg, 220 Pa. 568, 70
A. 433 (1908) (city decided to select architect of new school by competition pursuant to
which nine architects submitted plans for the school as required by the contest rules); see
also RnSTATzI&NT (SzcoND) oF CoNTRAcTs § 72 (1981).
170. Titan Envtl. Constr. Sys., Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 421 F. Supp. 1289,
1293 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977).
171. While some firms may guarantee partnership upon satisfactory performance,
others will state that an associate is hired as a "potential partner"; that is, as someone who
is eligible to compete for partnership. Cf. Note, Selection of a Law Partner, supra note 24,
at 293, n.69. The author stated:
It is not unusual for the recruiting literature of firms to intimate that advancement
to partnership is almost automatic by stating that it assumes every associate hired
is a potential partner and that its expectation is that the associate will become a
partner in a certain number of years.
Id. Often associates ask, before choosing which firm to join, whether they will be eligible for
partnership. Thus, an associate might specifically have been told that she is eligible for
partnership. The promise might be repeated periodically in work evaluations if the associate
is told that she is partnership material and is encouraged to keep up the good work and long
hours.
172. It may be the practice of a firm that all associates hired are eligible to compete for
partnership; therefore, it might be reasonable for an associate hired to assume she is eligible
for partnership. Similarly, a firm might have a policy that all associates are eligible to com-
pete for partnership unless the associate and the firm negotiate a different arrangement.
Sometimes part-time associates will negotiate a permanent associate position. Any associate
not having negotiated permanent associate status when hired might reasonably assume that
she was eligible to compete for partnership.
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the Restatement of Contracts refers to a "total breach. 173 The re-
quirement of a total breach does not mean that restitution is un-
available if the defendant has delivered a portion of the promised
consideration. Rather it means that the breach must be material
174
and that the contract must not be divisible. 75
The consideration of the law firm under the contract includes
a performance-payment of salary-and a promise-that the asso-
ciate will be eligible for partnership. There is a presumption in the
law that when a party's consideration under a contract is a combi-
nation of performance and a promise the two are treated collec-
173. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
174. Professor Palmer noted that "[i]t is common to describe restitution as a remedy
generally available for substantial breach of contract," but he also cautioned that this "can
be a dangerously misleading generalization." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.1, at 367 (foot-
note omitted). He added: "The word 'essential' is not being used as a term of art ... ['Es-
sential' and similar expressions] are used merely to stress the fact that the breach must be
of a relatively high degree of importance." Id. § 4.3, at 409. Illustration 2 of Section 373 of
the Second Restatement of Contracts describes a breach for which restitution is not availa-
ble as "not material." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 232 & comment a (1981);
see also id. § 241 (describing "significant circumstances" in determining materiality).
175. "Sometimes a contract is 'divisible' in the sense that parts of the performances to
be exchanged on each side are properly regarded as a pair of agreed equivalents. See J 240."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 comment c (1981). Illustration 9 describes a
situation in which someone who contracts to build a house is paid in monthly progress pay-
ments of 85% of the price of the previous month's work. Upon breach, restitution for the
reasonable value of the services is available because the work and the payments "are not
agreed equivalents under the rule stated in § 240." Id. § 373 illus. 9.
See also Lopp v. Peerless Serum Co., 382 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1964). There, the plaintiff
agreed to sell pharmaceutical product formulas and a company name to defendant in ex-
change for an employment agreement with the defendant company. When defendant
breached the employment agreement defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not seek
restitution for the value of the formulas because the sale of the formulas was a divisible part
of the contract. The court held:
[T]he matters of consideration are entire and are not apportionable-that $7,500
was not all that [plaintiff] was to receive for the formulas, but, in addition, he was
to have an employment contract. The question of whether a contract is entire or
severable is primarily one of intention which "is to be determined from the lan-
guage which the parties have used and the subject matter of the agreement." Swin-
ney v. Continental Bldg. Co., 340 Mo. 611, 102 S.W.2d 111, 120, where it is also said,
quoting Williston, Contracts, 1652, § 963, that the essential test "can be nothing
else than the answer to an inquiry whether the parties assented to all the promises
as a single whole, so that there would have been no bargain whatever if any prom-
ise or set of promises were struck out." (Emphasis added). Considering the words
used in the instant contract, if the matter of the sale and purchase of the formulas
and name. . . were stricken, clearly the parties would not have reached the agree-
ment which they did.
Id. at 624; see also Coon v. Schoeneman, 476 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (contract
rate of payment does not make contract divisible).
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tively and a breach of the promise is material and thus is a total
breach of the contract.
1 7 6
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 232 & comment a (1981). Section 241 pro-
vides that:
[A]n important circumstance in determining whether a failure is material is the
extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasona-
bly expected from the exchange .... If the consideration given by either party
consists partly of some performance and only partly of a promise (see Comment a
to § 232), regard must be had to the entire exchange ....
Id. § 241 comment b. Section 232 provides that when consideration "consists in whole or in
part of promises, all the performances to be rendered by each party taken collectively are
treated as performances to be exchanged. . . ." Id. § 232. Comment a to that section states:
The rules applicable to performances to be exchanged under an exchange of
promises are designed to give the parties maximum protection, consistent with free-
dom of contract, against a disappointment of their expectation of a subsequent ex-
change of those performances. When the parties have exchanged promises, there is
ordinarily every reason to suppose that they contracted on the basis of such an
expectation since the exchange of promises would otherwise have little purpose.
Id. § 232 comment a.
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides an illustration in which a seller agrees
to sell goods and advertising materials and also promises not to sell advertising materials to
any other buyer. A breach of the promise not to sell advertising to a competitor can be
material and justify the buyer's refusal to take and pay for the goods. See id. § 232 com-
ment a, illus. 1; see also E.H. Boly & Son, Inc. v. Schneider, 525 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1975). On
the sale of an apartment building to the defendant, the broker reduced the commission from
$34,125 to $4,125 in exchange for the defendant's promise that the broker would be the
exclusive selling agent for the apartment when it was converted to condominiums and would
share in the profits. When the defendant did not convert the apartments to condominiums,
the defendant totally breached the contract with the broker who was entitled to restitution
of $30,000. Id. at 25.
Professor Palmer said that "[i]n deciding whether the breach is essential enough to
justify restitution, a court should be concerned primarily with the objective of the plaintiff
in seeking the performance promised by the defendant." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.5,
at 410. Palmer discusses with approval Buffalo Builders' Supply Co. v. Reeb, 247 N.Y. 170,
159 N.E. 899 (1928), in which plaintiff bought defendant's business for an agreed price and
a promise that the defendant would not compete. The defendant later breached. The court
granted restitution stating that "the defendant's agreement not to do business was the dom-
inant purpose of the contract and not merely a collateral part." Id. at 175, 159 N.E. at 901.
Professor Palmer added that the "decision is just, but any implication that restitution
should be limited to instances in which the dominant purpose of the plaintiff has been de-
feated through the defendant's breach should be rejected." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64,
§ 4.5, at 412. Professor Palmer criticized Rosenwasser v. Blyn Shoes, Inc., 246 N.Y. 340, 159
N.E. 84 (1927), in which the defendant had sold its stock to the plaintiff for $100,000, and
the officers of the defendant had promised that their company would do business with the
plaintiff's company. That promise was breached and the court viewed it as "incidental to
the main purpose of the contract." Id. at 348, 159 N.E. at 86. Professor Palmer criticized
this analysis as having focused on defendant's main purpose, rather than on plaintiff's: "The
plaintiff did not receive an important part of the consideration for which he paid the money,
and this is all that is meant when the breach is described as essential." 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 4.5, at 411.
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For associates interested in partnership, the facts accord with
the presumption. The promise of eligibility for partnership is a
material, indivisible, and essential part of the contract between the
associate and the partners. An associate interested in partnership
does not view her job as one for which a salary is sufficient com-
pensation, but rather as one in which she is working to establish a
permanent career and in which the promise of eligibility for part-
nership is an integral part of the compensation. 177 If an associate
had known she was not eligible for partnership she might not have
joined the firm or, if she had joined the firm as a permanent associ-
ate, she might have a professionally excellent but less than all-con-
suming career. The promise of eligibility motivates an associate to
work diligently and for many hours, perhaps foregoing personal ac-
tivities in order to work extra hours. The promise induces extra
effort.1 78 In fact, the less the prospect of partnership is guaranteed,
the harder some associates may work. Failure to work long hours
or to forego vacations may be reasons for denying partnership.
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, in her book Women in Law, discussed
"Wall Street-type firms, those with a hundred or more... law-
yers" throughout the nation,179 and stated:
Because the stakes are high (partnerships provide lifelong tenure
and average incomes of over $200,000), young lawyers typically
invest a large amount of time and energy at work ....
Full-time work is not enough for a lawyer, especially for an
ambitious younger lawyer. The norms of the legal profession
equate excellence with hard work, measured in part by long
hours. Smigel's study of Wall Street firms indicates that overtime
work is not only common but expected, and that "going home is
the wrong choice if an associate wants to stay with a law firm or
to get ahead in one."'' 0
177. Of course, not all associates are interested in partnership. They make their choices
as to their work style based on other motivations. The firm may also benefit financially from
their work, but so long as the firm does not discriminate against them, the firm has not
breached its contract and is entitled to retain the benefits.
178. The Eleventh Circuit in Hishon stated: "We are well aware of the significance
given a firm's partnership policy by a prospective associate in determining the proper career
choice." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d at 1029; see also Note, Selection of a Law
Partner, supra note 24, at 293 (possibility of partnership induces associates to join the firm
and work diligently). See generally White, supra note 24, at 1106 (partnership prospects
diminish drawbacks of job such as low beginning pay and undesirable working conditions).
179. C. EPSTmN, supra note 131, at 175.
180. Id. at 205 (citing E. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer Reconsidered, Nzw YORK,
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Ms. Epstein also stated that "there is no doubt that the ambitious
lawyer will put in long hours." '181 Furthermore, partners are aware
that competition for partnership motivates hard work. Many of
them were associates before they became partners. 182
Most, if not all, of the hours worked by an associate presuma-
bly would not be spent at the defendant firm if she knew that her
gender would disqualify her from a partnership position. In an
analogous example, the court in Palmer v. Central Board of Edu-
cation of Pittsburga" recognized that a chance of winning a com-
petition that would select an architect for a city school was "the
chief inducement" for the architect contestants' labors. In that
competition, architects were to submit plans and specifications.
The losing architects were to be compensated $750. The court held
that "[u]nder any fair and reasonable method of selection by com-
petition, the chief inducement for anyone to take upon himself the
labor and expense incident to the submission of plans would be the
chance that upon a fair and impartial examination his plan might
win acceptance. '"I8 For an associate seeking partnership, eligibility
to compete for it is a "chief inducement" to join a particular firm
and work diligently.
In restitution, when the defendant has partially performed but
the breach is material, the plaintiff must return the defendant's
performance.18 5 When the defendant's partial performance is the
payment of money, a plaintiff need not tender the money prior to
suit, but the court or jury can deduct that amount from the defen-
dant's benefit in determining the amount of the judgment.1 8 6 The
Aug. 18, 1969, at 75).
181. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 131, at 208.
182. "In many high prestige firms, the senior partners (whose own apprenticeships were
served in an era of total involvement in the law) still expect that promising young lawyers
will be prepared to work late into the night, for weeks or even months, if necessary." Id.
183. 220 Pa. 568, 70 A. 433 (1908).
184. Id. at 576, 70 A. at 436; see also Hertz v. Montgomery Journal Publishing Co., 9
Ala. App. 178, 62 So. 564 (1913) (plaintiff expended services in hopes of winning a prize for
the most newspaper subscriptions).
185. See supra note 132. Professor Palmer stated: "The plaintiff may have received a
part of the [defendant's] performance or he may have received nothing. In the former case,
he will be entitled to restitution only on returning or in some way accounting for the value
of the performance he received." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.5, at 410.
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oi RESTITUTION § 19 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1983). That comment provides: "If the court has the power to assure the required return in
connection with the relief it grants, it is not necessary that there have been a prior return or
offer to return." Id. The Second Restatement of Contracts states that "[i]f all that is to be
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law firm's partial performance is payment of compensation and
other benefits, which is deducted from the total benefit.18 7
c. The Breach
When a partnership discriminates because of sex or claims to
have a right to discriminate because of sex18 against an associate
who was hired with a promise that she would be eligible to com-
pete for partnership, the partnership has breached its contract
with the associate. If an associate is not made a partner because of
sex discrimination, then sex was the only factor or at least one fac-
tor used in the partnership decision. If sex was the only factor con-
sidered, then the associate was ineligible for partnership and her
work, which was motivated by the promise of eligibility, was ig-
nored.189 Thus, the partners breached their promise that the asso-
ciate would be eligible to compete for partnership.190
If sex was one factor in the adverse partnership decision, then
the associate's work was considered, but not equally with that of
the men. The female associate's work had to be better than that
considered acceptable for a male associate.191 This dual standard is
returned is money, a credit against a larger sum allowed in restitution will suffice." RESTATE-
MJENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384 comment b (1981). Professor Palmer stated:
The principal departure from the rule of the law courts [requiring plaintiff to
return or tender what had been received from defendant prior to suit] is where the
plaintiff seeks a money judgment and must himself return money. Here there is
good authority for the view that return or tender is not necessary, since the amount
to be returned can be deducted from the plaintiff's claim.
1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 3.11, at 298; see also E.H. Boly & Son v. Schneider, 525 F.2d
20, 24 (9th Cir. 1975) (restitution award is the value of the performance rendered by the
injured party, less the amount of benefits received as part performance).
187. See supra text at Tables 1-3 & note 132.
188. See supra note 62.
189. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). "The sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result...
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class
of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members." Id. at 686 (Brennan, J.).
190. Cf. Titan Envtl. Constr. Sys., Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 421 F. Supp.
1289 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977). The court stated:
In return for Titan's [a design and construction company] services, the School Dis-
trict was to afford Titan the opportunity to bid on three school building projects.
That agreement was breached when the School District withdrew the three projects
from public bidding. For the breach of that agreement, Titan is entitled to recover
the reasonable value of the services it rendered to the School District.
Id. at 1293.
191. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 114 (1st
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also a breach of a promise of eligibility since a promise that one is
on the "partnership track" implies that there is one track, not a
separate, steeper track for women. In Palmer, where the city
planned to choose an architect by competition and then aban-
doned the competition without reviewing the architects' plans, the
court held that "a fair and impartial examination" is the "chief
inducement" and therefore a requirement of "any fair and reason-
able method of selection by competition. ' 192 A steeper "track,"
which is an undisclosed handicap to eligibility, is not a fair and
impartial examination.19 s
An associate does not have to prove that she would have been
made a partner but for the discrimination in order to prove that
discrimination is a breach of the promise of eligibility. There are at
least two reasons why this is so. First, the partnership's promise
was a promise that the associate was eligible to compete for part-
nership, not a guarantee that she would be made a partner. There-
fore, the breach occurs either when the associate is not considered
or when she is separately considered for partnership because of her
sex.194 The fact that partnership decisions may be highly subjective
may make it difficult, but not impossible, for a plaintiff to prove
that the firm breached its promise that she was eligible. 95 Diffi-
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (sex discrimination includes the practice of
subjecting women to higher standards of evaluation than are applied to males). "Given the
wide discretion that interviewers and supervisors have to measure the 'total person' and to
waive some criteria if other criteria are satisfied, it is possible that, at least in some cases,
the criteria have been applied more stringently with respect to women." Leisner v. New
York Telephone Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
192. Palmer v. Central Bd. of Educ. of Pittsburg, 220 Pa. at 576, 70 A. at 436.
193. Because discrimination breaches a promise of eligibility to compete, the promise
made when the associate is hired could be viewed as a promise not to discriminate. Cf.
Wald, supra note 21, at 48-50. Ms. Wald would imply a promise not to discriminate in
employment contracts on the ground that such contracts incorporate federal law. Here the
promise not to discriminate is based on the nature of the promise of eligibility to compete
for partnership and is independent of federal law.
194. See supra note 191.
195. Discrimination is not always easy to prove, see, e.g., Note, Selection of a Law
Partner, supra note 24, at 282, especially when advancement criteria are subjective. When
subjective criteria are used in an employment selection process, however, the danger of dis-
crimination is great. "A supervisor judging a subordinate for promotion potential tends to
look for traits which the supervisor feels he himself has." Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Em-
ployment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REv. 737, 739 (1976). "An evaluation of an
applicant's subjective qualities, as opposed to an assessment of objective qualifications, de-
pends upon the personal biases and experiences of the interviewer." Note, Subjective Em-
ployment Criteria, supra note 84, at 167. "Such high-level subjectivity subjects the ultimate
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culty of proof, however, does not exempt a defendant from liability
promotion decision to the intolerable occurrence of conscious or unconscious prejudice."
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1976). The object of Title VII,
however, "is the elimination of employment discrimination, whether practiced knowingly or
unconsciously and in relation to employment or advancement criteria which, although neu-
tral on its face, is in fact discriminatory in its application." EEOC v. University of New
Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974).
The danger of using subjective standards in high level employment evaluations is thus
great. As Professor Bartholet noted: "Upper level subjective systems typically invest deci-
sion-makers with broad discretion, allowing the expression of personal bias and inviting se-
lection of candidates who resemble those doing the selecting." Bartholet, supra note 24, at
996. She added:
Although... subjective measures may appear far more sensible than a purely ob-
jective approach for most upper level jobs, the use of subjective measures poses
serious problems of fairness and accuracy. Those who subjectively assess an em-
ployee's job performance will ordinarily be higher level employees of the same em-
ployer. A subjective criterion measure for evaluating job performance may strongly
resemble the selection procedures that kept many minorities from being hired in
the first place.
Id. at 1020. See generally Stacy, supra; Note, Subjective Employment Criteria, supra note
84; cf. Waintroob, supra note 24, at 45 (subjective criteria permissible if procedural fairness
is ensured).
In cases involving discrimination, at least in lower levels of employment, courts recog-
nize the dangers involved when employers use subjective selection criteria. Professor
Bartholet noted: "At the lower level, subjective processes that have an adverse racial impact
have almost uniformly been condemned. The courts have generally relied at least in part on
the theory that subjective processes lend themselves to the expression of conscious or un-
conscious bias." Bartholet, supra note 24, at 973-74; see also id. at 1020 n.221 (discussing
cases that reject subjective evaluations as validation for tests).
The fact that a promotion system is highly subjective does not mean that it insulates
discrimination. In a Title VII case involving allegations that a law firm discriminated in
hiring women, the court said that "although a law firm is undoubtedly free to make com-
plex, subjective judgments as to how impressive an applicant is, it is not free to inject into
the selection process the a priori assumption that, as a whole, women are less acceptable
professionally than men." Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 521 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). Another court has said:
[U]se of subjective criteria is open to attack where the criteria are vague and unre-
lated to the qualities necessary for successful on-the-job performance .... A dis-
tinction must be made between such vague, subjective criteria, and criteria which,
although subjective, are job-related, clearly defined in terms of the competences to
be measured, and capable of being applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Nath v. General Electric Co., 438 F. Supp. 213, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1977). If use of vague criteria
such as "we know it when we see it" or "we look for an unspecified package of attributes" or
-an "unspecified extra dimension" result in a disproportionately adverse impact on women,
that impact may permit an inference of discrimination, conscious or unconscious, on the
basis of sex. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 950 (10th Cir. 1980)
(company's subjective decisions on promotion had a discriminatory impact on females;
plaintiff's failure to advance was the result of the discriminatory policies and practices); cf.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 438 (1975) (validation of test by subjective
supervisorial rankings that were "extremely vague and fatally open to divergent interpreta-
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for a proven breach.
Even if a firm were to choose its partners arbitrarily, which is
unlikely,1" the firm would not be immunized from liability for
breaching its agreement that the plaintiff was eligible to compete
for partnership. Eliminating an associate from eligibility on the ba-
sis of sex is not arbitrary; it is deliberate. The associate's name is
removed from the pool being considered for partnership before ar-
bitrary factors are used to choose partners. For example, if the
partners put all the names in a hat and chose two, that would be
arbitrary. If an associate were discriminatorily excluded, however,
her name would not be in the hat. She was never considered and
never had an opportunity to be selected.197 She had worked for the
past years, however, believing that she was eligible for partnership.
tion" with disproportionate impact on blacks insufficient); see also Stacy, supra, at 744-52
and cases cited therein; Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level"
Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1614 (1973). See generally Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene
State College, 604 F.2d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1979) (promotion of one woman with outstanding
credentials does not preclude finding of sex discrimination as to others), cert. denied, 444
U.s 1045 (1980).
Sometimes, however, discrimination may be blatant and perhaps easy to prove. See
generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (letter from Congressman stated that his
administrative assistant's understudy must be a man); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (job abolished in retaliation for plaintiffs refusal to grant sexual favors). An in
depth discussion of how to prove discrimination is, however, outside the scope of this article.
196. Many partnerships choose partners based on their legal abilities, their abilities to
generate business or some other factor or factors that were demonstrated by the associate
while working at the firm. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
"We are willing to presume [an inference of discrimination] largely because we know from
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner,
without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting." Id. at 577.
197. The Second Circuit, in a Title VII suit for damages without injunctive relief, held
that failure to consider an applicant for a promotion solely because she was a woman was
discrimination even though the man hired for the contested position was better qualified
than she. Gilln v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973). The court stated
that "while the ultimate prize was won by the male who had superior qualifications, this in
our view does not purge [the defendant] of its prior discriminatory act of refusing to con-
sider her at all not solely because of lack of qualification but because she was a woman." Id.
at 102. The court then said that "it is difficult to determine the basis for compensatory
damages here" but remanded the case to give the plaintiff an opportunity "to establish her
theory of damages." Id. at 103.
As the Gillin court suggested, it is difficult to determine compensatory damages for
back pay unless the plaintiff could prove she would have obtained the contested position.
Where the recovery is the defendant's unjust enrichment from having breached the promise
of eligibility for consideration for partnership, however, there is no need for the plaintiff to
prove that she would have been made a partner, only that she was not considered for part-
nership because she was a woman, or was considered more stringently because she was a
woman, in breach of the promise of eligibility.
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In addition, her work benefitted the partnership.
The fact that other associates were considered for partnership
but not selected does not defeat an associate's claim. As to the as-
sociates considered, the firm kept its promise that they were eligi-
ble to compete for partnership. These associates had an opportu-
nity to "win" the competition.
Second, certainty of making partner goes to the issue whether
damage to a plaintiff for breach of contract can be measured once
a breach of a material promise has been proven, not to the issue
whether there was a breach of a promise of eligibility. For example,
in Palmer, the court held that the city had breached its contract
by abandoning the competition and refusing to review the plans
that the architects submitted pursuant to the terms of the compe-
tition.198 The court also held, however, that the plaintiffs, three of
the contestant architects, could not recover damages for breach of
contract:
What the plaintiffs lost was the chance of having some one of the
plans submitted win the prize, and this was the inducement to
the expenditure of labor involved in the preparation and the sub-
mission of plans .... To recover anything more than nominal
damages in a common-law action, actual, substantial injury would
have to be shown, and in the very nature of the case that would
be impossible here. To show actual loss, plaintiffs would be re-
quired to show affirmatively at least a reasonable probability that
some one of the plans submitted would, had they been examined,
have received the approval of the board. Since the acceptance of
any of the plans rested ultimately in the discretion of the board,
this would be impossible.1"
The court also denied recovery in restitution because the city had
not obtained a benefit at the plaintiffs' expense. The city did not
198. Palmer v. Central Bd. of Educ. of Pittsburg, 220 Pa. at 576, 70 A. at 436.
199. Id.; see also Hertz v. Montgomery Journal Publishing Co., 9 Ala. App. 178, 62 So.
564 (1913). In Hertz, a newpaper held a contest pursuant to which the person who gathered
the most subscriptions would win a prize. The newspaper changed the rules after some of
the contestants had begun soliciting subscriptions. The new rules would give greater value
to later solicited subscriptions. The court said that this change of rules was a breach of
contract but "the measure of ... damages would not have been the value of the prize of-
fered, since it was a pure speculation as to whether or not [the plaintiff] would get it." Id. at
186, 62 So. at 567. The court also said that the plaintiff could have "sued [the] defendant on
the common count for work and labor done and recovered under an implied contract on a
quantum meruit for the value of the services she had actually performed in securing sub-
scriptions for defendant's paper and otherwise. . . ." Id. This is a restitutionary theory.
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use the plans and the contestants did not part with them. 00 Since
the legal remedies were therefore inadequate, the court ordered the
city to consider the plans in good faith as the contest provided.
Unlike the situation in Palmer, a law firm does benefit from the
time and work that an associate puts in, at the associate's expense;
therefore, when an associate is discriminatorily denied a partner-
ship position, an action in restitution provides an appropriate
remedy.
2. The Injustice of Discrimination
In addition, although it is not necessary, a new area of restitu-
tion could be created. Professor Dawson stated that "nothing...
prevents an appropriate unjust enrichment remedy from being
used in any field." 201 He added that "restitution remedies . . .
have implications that reach in every direction ... ."12 It follows
from Professor Dawson's statements, and from the fact that society
has begun prohibiting employment discrimination as a form of in-
justice,'03 that the common law can and should do likewise. Em-
ployment discrimination is unjust and is therefore one of the fields
into which restitution should be extended.0
3. Inadequacy of Damages
Although restitution is not limited to situations in which dam-
ages are inadequate, inadequacy of the damage remedy is an addi-
tional reason for permitting recovery in restitution.0 5 Restitution
200. Palmer, 220 Pa. at 577, 70 A. at 436. The court said that "[p]laintiffs have not lost
their plans and specifications. They are still theirs as much as ever." Id. Where a design and
construction company had given services to a school district in exchange for the "opportu-
nity to bid" on a project, the company was awarded the reasonable value of those services
upon defendant's breach of the agreement. See Titan EnvtL Constr. Sys., Inc. v. School
Dist. of Philadelphia, 421 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (E.D Pa. 1976), af'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1977). The refusal of American courts to quantify a lost opportunity except in narrow cir-
cumstances has been criticized and is not the rule in England. See J. CALAMAR & J. Pa-
RILLO, THz LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10-14, at 533-34 (2d ed. 1977).
201. J. DAWSON, supra note 89, at 113.
202. Id. at 117; see supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
203. See supra note 10 for an example of a federal anti-discrimination law; Wald, supra
note 21 for a discussion of state anti-discrimination laws.
204. In order for a plaintiff to recover in restitution for a discriminatory denial of part-
nership, it is not necessary that she argue that discrimination is a new category of restitu-
tion. Application of long existing categories of unjust enrichment, such as a material breach
of contract, will produce the same result. See supra text accompanying notes 159-200.
205. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.7, at 427-28; see also id. § 1.6, at 33; G.
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is particularly appropriate when damages from a breach of con-
tract cannot be ascertained with certainty.ss
DOUTHWArrE, supra note 72, § 1.3, at 8 (Supp. 1980); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Rusrrru-
TON § 1 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
206. Professor Palmer described a number of reasons why a plaintiff would prefer resti-
tution over other causes of action. One of the reasons is that "proof of damages may present
unusual difficulties, whereas proof of the value of [plaintiff's] performance is relatively easy,
and restitution is the means by which [the plaintiff] recovers the value of that perform-
ance." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 64, § 4.1, at 368 (footnote omitted). Seavey and Scott said
that "in some cases it is essential that [restitution] be permitted, as where the plaintiff
cannot obtain specific performance and would meet with insuperable difficulties in proving
damage." Seavey & Scott, supra note 69, at 37. Professor Sullivan remarked:
Various reasons may explain why an aggrieved party chooses to sue in quasi-con-
tract rather than for damages for breach of contract [including] [w]here the plaintiff
cannot establish the value of his expected losses with certainty an action in quasi-
contract becomes an attractive alternative that will permit judgment for the
plaintiff.
Sullivan, supra note 72, at 7 n.40 (citing Shriver v. Cook, 256 Iowa 271, 278-79, 127 N.W.
102, 106-07 (1964) (value of possible future half ownership of business an impossible mea-
sure of damages to prove)).
Childres and Garamella stated:
Not only is [defendant's returning plaintiff's property when the defendant has
no legitimate claim to the property] everywhere thought just, but also the rule fos-
ters administrative convenience by easing the court's task of evaluation. By order-
ing the defendant to return the claimant's money, the court avoids uncertainty
about the value defendant's performance might have had to the plaintiff.
Childres & Garamella, supra note 72, at 443. In Shea v. Willard, 85 N.J. Super. 446, 205
A.2d 74 (1964), the court said:
[W]e might well take a different view of the availability of the restitutionary rem-
edy here, having regard to the calloused default by the defendant after plaintiff's
self-sacrificing performance of his undertaking, if an ample remedy by way of dam-
ages were not here feasibly practicable. Compare the case where the value of the
performance promised by the defaulting defendant cannot be ascertained.
Id. at 452, 205 A.2d at 77 (citing 5 A. CoRBiN, supra note 165, § 1110, at 590). In Shea, a
pharmacist agreed to work for less than the usual rate of pay and an option to purchase the
business. The owner breached the option agreement. Id. at 448, 205 A.2d at 75-76. Professor
Palmer criticized the court's holding that the proper award would be damages for the
breach, not restitution for the amount of services. Professor Palmer stated: "Recovery mea-
sured by the value of the uncompensated services performed under the contract is a just
recovery, and there is no acceptable reason for denying such relief." 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 4.3, at 387 (footnote omitted).
Shea is distinguishable from a discriminatory denial of partnership because an associ-
ate's recovery is based on the benefit the law firm acquires by exchanging her hours for
money, not on a quantum meruit value of services without a measurable benefit to the
defendant. Even if Shea were not distinguishable and were viewed as correctly decided, the
case would still be inapplicable to a discriminatory denial of partnership because the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey indicated that the case might have been differently decided if
there had not been measurable damages for the breach of promise. See Shea, 85 N.J. Super.
at 452, 205 A.2d at 77. For a breach of a promise of eligibility for partnership damages
cannot be ascertained with certainty.
Restitution and Discrimination
A discriminatory denial of partnership is a total breach of con-
tract by the defendant for which restitution is appropriate. Con-
tract damages would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
for such a breach. It would be difficult to measure the value of the
lost partnership, or the harm from not having been considered for
partnership after having worked for six years on the assumption of
eligibility to compete for partnership.0 7 Recovery in restitution,
however, is easy to measure. The recovery is the amount of the law
firm's benefit gained from the associate's work after deduction of
the salary and other benefits the firm has given to the associate.20 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Restitution, or liability in unjust enrichment, provides an as-
sociate the opportunity to prove that she was discriminated against
in the partnership decision. Upon proof of discrimination, restitu-
tion remedies the discrimination by requiring the law firm to dis-
gorge its benefit received from the associate. While a money judg-
ment may not fully compensate someone who has been
discriminated against, it is far better than no remedy at all. Since
the amount of recovery in restitution is potentially substantial, ap-
plication of the theory should have a deterrent effect upon discrim-
ination by law firms. Nor would the deterrent effect require any
onerous activity on the part of firms. They need only choose not to
discriminate in the selection of partners, or choose to return the
benefit they received from those whom they excluded from part-
nership because of sex, race, color, religion or national origin.
To do justice, courts should also apply Title VII not only to
prevent discrimination at entry level career positions, but also to
prevent discrimination at the higher level positions that represent
power, money, and prestige. Justice is not done when Title VII en-
ables women to obtain jobs only to be forced out of them six years
later because of their sex. Until courts recognize this, however, and
even after they do, discrimination against high level professionals
can be remedied to some extent by depriving those who discrimi-
207. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55, 199.
208. See supra notes 126-55 and accompanying text. Although statutes of limitation are
specified by each state, the statute of limitations for restitution is typically six years. Thus,
for restitution based upon breach of contract, the cause of action would accrue upon the
occurrence of the breach, the discriminatory denial of partnership. See 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 64, § 2.3, at 89.
19831
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nate of their unjust enrichment. In this situation, restitution pre-
vents the injustice of a wrong without a remedy.
